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THE COLLAPSE OF THE NEW ENGLAND THEOLOGY

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I.

Doctor Foster's book¹ has brought to the attention of scholars the entire movement of the New England theology in its genesis, development, culmination, and collapse. The book is conspicuous for learning, ability, fairness, and sincerity. For the thorough apprehension of this school of theology the volume is the best that we possess. When we reflect that an entire generation has risen up since the last great master of the New England divinity closed his labors, at Andover, in 1881, and that students of theology today can nowhere hear the old system expounded as it was wont to be expounded, Doctor Foster's book is at once seen to answer an essential need of the time.

While the psychological interest in Doctor Foster's work is the keener, owing to the fact that during the composition of it the author passed from the position of a disciple in the New England school of thought to that of one no longer able to name himself among its adherents; and while it is a significant witness to the writer's integrity that, had he rewritten his book after he underwent this change of opinion, the historical and critical portions of it would hardly have required at his hand any considerable modification, yet it is on the whole to be regretted that the final state of mind to which Doctor Foster felt himself obliged to come

¹ A History of the New England Theology. By Frank Hugh Foster. University Press, Chicago, 1907.

could not have been the shaping spirit in which his work was cast. For after all what concerns us most is the collapse of this system of belief. Having lived so long, and having proved itself mighty over so many generations of able and noble men, how came it suddenly to melt into thin air? It is not enough to expound the old beliefs and to exclaim, "How are the mighty fallen!" If possible we wish to know why the mighty are no more. In addition to the important service that Doctor Foster has done as the historian of the New England theology, may we not hope that he will lay us under still greater obligations by a volume embodying his final and elaborated criticism of this school of thought? While awaiting this greater service, some thoughts are here offered in explanation of the sudden and complete collapse of the historic theology of New England. As no wise man cares either to write or to read a merely negative production, I shall consider the collapse in the interest of certain precious survivals, and these again as preserving under new forms a permanent theological type.

What is the New England theology? In a general way it is the philosophy of the Christian faith originating with Augustine; reduced to severe order and expounded with energy and consistency by John Calvin; revived by Jonathan Edwards, and by him and his successors related to the speculative questions and religious conditions of a new land and a new people. From first to last it consisted in five main determinations, the old five points of Calvinism slightly rearranged: the sovereignty of God, the depravity of man, the atonement for sin made by Jesus Christ, the irresistible grace of the Holy Spirit, and the perseverance of believers in Christ. The system began with the divine sovereignty; with the predestination of all events; with a world fallen, yet under the purpose of God; and with a scheme of salvation limited to a certain predetermined number, and exclusive of or indifferent to the rest of mankind. Nathaniel W. Taylor here speaks for the entire school. In his discussion of the doctrine of election he remarks: "The simple matter of fact which I would state, and which constitutes the entire doctrine of election is this: That God has eternally purposed to renew, and sanctify,

and save a part only of mankind." The perseverance of true believers must be read in the light of the irresistible grace of the Holy Spirit; this again must be traced through the sacrifice of Christ back to the elective decree of the Most High; and still further this determination to save only a part of mankind must be seen to be one phase of God's absolute sovereignty in the universe.

Upon this general framework of belief all the New England theologians were agreed. For them there were but two systems of theology, the Calvinistic and the Arminian; and for the latter they had, in general and in particular, something very like contempt. So far as I have been able to search their writings, no one of these thinkers has defined the science of theology. They did not conceive definition to be necessary. They had absorbed from childhood the Calvinistic scheme; it took tremendous, almost exclusive, hold of their intellect. When they studied the Bible, it seemed to look into their souls from nearly every page, and the history of this sad world was the conclusive witness to the truth of its doctrine concerning man. Jonathan Edwards, the elder and the younger, Joseph Bellamy, Samuel Hopkins, Nathanael Emmons, Nathaniel W. Taylor, and Edwards A. Park, the great masters of the school, were at one here. Horace Bushnell is the pioneer of a new movement, and therefore does not in this connection concern us. Samuel Harris was a deep thinker in theology and an eminent teacher; but he too had outgrown the old New England categories. Professor Park was the last of the New England theologians. These thinkers without exception held the sovereignty of God, whether construed as including or as not including the fall; they held to the innate depravity of mankind; they traced this universal condition of the race to the sin of the first man, however they may have differed with older thinkers or among themselves in the account given of the relation of the individual to Adam; they were agreed that without atonement there is no forgiveness of sin, and that this necessary atonement had been made by Jesus Christ; they were united in the belief that the Holy Spirit is essential to the conversion and regeneration of man, that till the Spirit's influence descends upon him, man is helpless in the presence of his moral

obligation, that when the divine grace comes it is irresistible, and that its dispensation is ruled not by the forlorn condition of a humanity lying in wickedness, but by the divine decree; and they were unanimous in their conviction that true believers in Jesus Christ will persevere to the end and be saved with an everlasting salvation. Upon this last point great emphasis was placed. It represented the final issue of the aboriginal sovereign decree; it was held with a vigor answering to the certainty of that decree; and hence any hesitation here was regarded as a reflection upon the supreme honor and power. Oliver Cromwell, in his question, Does once a Christian mean always a Christian? represents the seriousness of the entire New England school upon this subject. A certain minister once complained to President Sparks of Harvard that his church was greatly distressed over the perseverance of the saints; to whom President Sparks replied in the modern spirit, but at the same time failing in insight into the Puritan character, "Our trouble here is with the perseverance of the sinners." It is a sign of the distance we have come, that the famous remark of Doctor Williams of Providence upon this subject is cherished as a supreme example of humor in theological debate. It was, however, far enough from this character in the mind of Doctor Williams. Meeting one day a preacher of Arminian opinions and demanding of him a proof-text for the monstrous belief that a soul once converted to God could fall away and be lost forever, and receiving in answer the citation of the parable of the ten virgins who all went forth to meet the bridegroom but of whom five fell away and were lost, the contemptuous rejoinder of Doctor Williams was that any man who believed a doctrine of Scripture on account of what five women said, and five foolish women at that, deserved to go to perdition.

In the presentation of these five points there were among the New England theologians noble rivalries and generous differences; there were, too, marked superiorities and inferiorities in acuteness and vigor, in force and felicity of exposition, in dialectical and apologetic skill; but, with the single exception of Edwards, they rarely went outside the Calvinistic plan, and without exception that plan stood as the final thought upon man's origin, history,

and destiny. Doctor Foster, while sensitive to the personal force of Edwards, is strangely wanting, for a mind of his candor, in appreciation of Edwards's rational strength. In ranking the founder of the school below Taylor and Park, he cannot be said to appreciate the solitary distinction of Edwards. Taylor and Park are, after Edwards, the acutest thinkers in the school; but in compass, in depth, in fertility of rational device, and above all in speculative genius, they are not to be mentioned by the side of Edwards. A full examination of the unpublished writings of Edwards would show a mind of singular openness and of unceasing movement. When a young man he wrote:

I observe that old men seldom have any advantage of new discoveries, because these are beside a way of thinking they are used to. Resolved, if ever I live to years, that I will be impartial to hear the reasons of all pretended discoveries, and receive them, if rational, how long soever I have been used to another way of thinking.

It can be said that this resolve, made in his early manhood, exerted over Edwards a continuous influence, an influence more decided in his later years. In his published writings Edwards occasionally forgets the traditional system and goes forth in the great quest of truth. His essays on the Will, the Nature of Virtue, the End for which God made the World, and the Religious Affections are untrammelled discussions. They are related logically to what in Edwards is deepest and most truly his own, his conception of the absolutely perfect God; and they succeed or fail according to their fidelity or infidelity to that conception. Edwards's size and passion win even for his errors a kind of consecration; while his occasional free movement in the pure vision of truth out beyond the boundaries of tradition marks him as unique in his school.

Still we must return to the simple fact that Calvinism was from first to last the philosophy of man and man's world held and taught by these thinkers. Side issues there were, many and important; large questions of theodicy were often in debate, especially in the case of Bellamy and Hopkins and Taylor; speculation concerning the moral government of God was rife; the consideration of human freedom called into existence, in addition to the great treatise of Edwards, a voluminous literature; the

divine life in man soared away into a wild idealism, as in the Hopkinsian conception of love; now and then these thinkers, and emphatically Edwards and Hopkins, struck notes more akin to the music of Spinoza than to that of John Calvin, and we hear in them answering strains to the lofty one-sidedness of the words, "He that truly loves God must not desire that God should love him in return"; yet, when this is freely admitted, it must be said that after these excursions these New England divines one and all returned to the main outline of the Calvinistic scheme, and settled in it as the final account of their religion.

II.

That this system of opinion has lost control of the religious mind of the present generation will be universally admitted. There are many teachers of religion with no theology; many with a new, and still more with a crude theology; but nowhere do we find men of modern training and respectable intellect holding the New England theology. Our question then is, How came this system of belief, dominant in our churches for more than one hundred and fifty years, suddenly in the last quarter of the nineteenth century to lose its hold upon thinking minds? What causes brought about its sudden and final collapse?

In any fair account of this collapse, while the chief blame must lie with the system itself, some blame will be seen to attach to the state of the public mind. There has arisen within the Christian Church considerable indifference to speculative thinking. Practical interests have been engrossing, as they should be; but the dependence of living, practical interests upon fundamental ideas and upon clearness on fundamental subjects has not been seen. The mill-round of the mind has been substituted for the sun-path. An indescribable pettiness, a mean kind of retail trade, has largely taken possession of the teachers of religion. The eternal spaces in which, like the planet, the world of practical interest lives and moves and has its being have fallen from the public mind. Hence questions of the origin of sin and its permission in a universe over which God is sovereign, serious thinking upon moral government, the nature of virtue, the character

of disinterested love, the decree of the Most High, and the eternal economy of his being, have not appealed to this generation. To the discredit of the generation be it said.

This age is characterized by a strong aversion to severe thinking. Immediacy has become a habit, perhaps a disease. Its motto is, He that runs may read; and the reader who intends to run as he reads must not choose for his race-course the New England divinity. The New England writers are far from dull; they know how to express themselves with precision and vigor; but they are thinkers, men who deal with ideas, who set ideas in new lights and support their views with definition and argument. They tax the intellect of the reader, and in return for his toil they make him aware of his intelligence—a thing that does not always happen at the present day with books on theological subjects. The discourses of Edwards and Bellamy and Hopkins and Emmons were spoken to New England farmers, their wives, and their sons and daughters; and when they were published they were read largely by the same class of persons. There was in those days eagerness to attack and master a difficult subject, keen interest in matter that in order to be understood had to be read a score of times, enthusiasm for some attainment in rational strength and in argumentative skill. Today, whatever cannot be understood in the twinkling of an eye is generally regarded with aversion. The supreme heresy in thinking is the call to intellectual toil. The kindergarten, while it may be good for children, when it becomes a universal method makes escape from intellectual childhood difficult. If severe thinking were as much admired in the New England of today as it was in the New England of fifty and one hundred years ago, more respect would be felt for the old divines, and their best works would be oftener read.

There is in the public mind the absence of a due sense of the difficulties that inhere in every possible view of the world. Criticism of the New England system has been current for so long that it has gained possession of the thoughtful public. The criticism is largely well founded; but it is apt to lead to utter revolt from the works of these able and honest men. They are blamed for failing to do what no mortal man has yet succeeded in doing, presenting a philosophy of man's world true to all the known facts

and giving complete satisfaction to the reason. In our new thinking we accept at our own hands a philosophy far enough from complete rationality, and we refuse to do the same by the men of the older thinking. It would do our philosophy of religion good to be considered and debated by the New England divines. We might find, perhaps, that all the difficulties and impossibilities are not with the ancient creed, and that some serious mysteries need clearing up at our hands.

While fair-minded men will, I think, admit the truth of this indictment against the public mind of today, the charge must be renewed that the chief causes of collapse must be found in the character of the ancient creed. The New England theology had taken for granted that it was substantially the final theology. While resting in this easy assumption it was, to the amazement and incredulity of its latest masters, suddenly outgrown. It fell from power and passed away because it was outgrown by the religious consciousness whose interpreter and servant it professed to be. On this ground its discharge was inevitable. The full significance of this explanation will become apparent, I hope, through the following observations.

It must never be forgotten that the New England divinity was not in any profound sense an original movement of thought. It was a new version of the system of John Calvin, in whom again, it must be observed, the system was not original. As is well known, the New England theology, while derived from Calvin, dates from Augustine. Thoughts of infinite moment are found in rich profusion in the writings of Augustine; and, next to his ecclesiasticism, the outline of a theological system contained in his works is the least of his services to the Christian intellect and spirit. There are in the profound spiritual and speculative life of Augustine hints toward a philosophy of Christianity other and infinitely nobler than that which he outlined, an implicit philosophy which continues to invest his great spirit with enduring fascination.

Still the outline of dogma made by Augustine has been the basis of the traditional scheme from that day to this. His idea of a race universally depraved, traced to the sin of Adam as its source, has been a ruling idea. His doctrine of salvation on the ground of Christ's atonement by irresistible grace calling into existence

saving faith and securing the perseverance of the believer has been a ruling doctrine. His scheme of deliverance as originating in the decree of God, and as contemplating the redemption of only a part of the fallen and miserable race of man, has been the dominating scheme. From Augustine's day to this the traditional theology has never held the idea of anything other or better than a salvation of the remnant. Therefore notwithstanding the order and vigor imparted to this scheme by John Calvin, and the valid distinctions, fruitful modifications, and noble expansions introduced by Edwards and his successors down to Professor Park, in whom the line terminates, the philosophy of man's life in this world and in the next presented in the New England theology is essentially that of the great Bishop of Hippo.

The New England scheme is thus wanting in fundamental originality. It arises out of no face-to-face contact with the problem of man's existence; it never occurs to it to interrogate the vast and tragic reality at first hand. Man and man's world were not independent and absorbing objects of study to the New England divines; man and his world did not possess their imagination; the knowledge of human beings already in existence did not in them raise the hope of richer knowledge; the scientific spirit, of which Bacon is the great modern prophet, the attitude toward their world of inquiry, concrete and severe methods of study and hope, did not control them; the human reality before them did not win them into an original relation to it, nor fascinate them onward to fresh discoveries, nor so engage them that they could not let it go till they had wrung from it by direct struggle its divine secret. These men were not seers; they beheld no new worlds of ideas rising up out of the mighty order of fact; they found no richer and deeper meanings in man's nature and history, such as would have inevitably suggested a new plan of salvation. They made little use, as will be seen later, of their Master in seeking a principle for the interpretation of the moral character of the universe; like thousands before them, they missed entirely the meaning of their Master's promise concerning the spirit of truth. They assumed that the religious vision of the world was complete as given in the New Testament; they did not grasp the fact that the words of Jesus are spirit and life, that they are an

organism of spirit and life; they never dreamed that Christianity is on its intellectual side the soul of sure search after all truth, the soul of assimilation to its own growing organism of all the special truths in all the different departments of human inquiry and concern, the soul that seizes these threads of discovered being wherever found and that weaves them into the ever-greatening structure of its own faith. Like their predecessors for more than a thousand years these New England divines were without original vision of the divine universe; they were mainly thinkers within traditional lines, expounders, advocates, diffusers of beliefs that had been fixed by ecclesiastical authority. All this is matter of fact. Whether they are to be praised or blamed for this attitude may indeed admit of difference of opinion; concerning the attitude itself there is no room for difference. I repeat that there is no distinct original consciousness of man and man's world in the New England divines; nor is their vision, in the full meaning of the words, deep, comprehensive, free. They all read the tragic reality through the ancient categories. They recall the traditional scheme essentially unaltered, and turn it into a philosophy of the Christian faith for themselves and their people. That such genius for theology as we find in Edwards, Hopkins, N. W. Taylor, and Edwards A. Park should have gone this dreary way is indeed deplorable. There are few greater warnings against the evils of self-commitment to tradition. The suppression of individuality, the settled disregard of inward misgiving and protest, the sacrifice of the ideal of reason and conscience in the service of faith, have seldom presented themselves in more conspicuous examples. Strong enough as these men were to overturn tradition and throw the contents of faith into new moulds, fitted as they were for original vision and interpretation of human existence, they one and all adopted, adapted, and tinkered the ancient scheme, while God's great growing world was speeding forward heedless of their poor categories. That a new version of an ancient and incompetent system, however impressed with the vitality of powerful minds, and however the bewildered masses allowed themselves to be driven to rest in it, could not last in a free world of which it is no true account should seem to reasonable men only natural, and indeed inevitable. Originality in theologi-

cal theory, fundamental constructive originality, there has been none from the age of Augustine to the present generation. Under such circumstances, in a growing world, there is no need of a ghost to tell us that there is something rotten in our theological Denmark.

It may be contended that there is one fairly original element in New England theology, its theodicy. Several of the greater masters of the school were deeply concerned with the fact of moral evil, and its existence in a world over which the righteous God is sovereign. Here the discussion turned upon two subjects, one the divine perfections, the other the freedom of man. Doctor Foster says, "New England theology to the end sacrificed the doctrine of freedom to that of the divine perfections." This is true, but it is not the whole truth. The New England theologians failed both in their conception of the divine perfection and in their idea of human freedom. Here, for example, is one of the multitude of utterances in Edwards concerning God. He had been speaking with his father about his religious experiences:

And when the discourse ended I walked abroad alone, in a solitary place in my father's pasture, for contemplation. And as I was walking there, and looking up on the sky and clouds, there came into my mind so sweet a sense of the glorious majesty and grace of God that I know not how to express. After this . . . the appearance of everything was altered; there seemed to be as it were, a calm, sweet cast, or appearance of divine glory in almost everything. God's excellency, his wisdom, his purity and love seemed to appear in everything; in the sun and moon and stars; in the clouds and the blue sky; in the grass, flowers, trees; in the water and all nature. I often used to sit and view the moon for continuance; and in the day spent much time in viewing the clouds and sky to behold the sweet glory of God in these things; in the meantime, singing forth with a low voice, my contemplations of the Creator and Redeemer.

In this poetic way Edwards sets forth in his early manhood his conception of God—a conception that grew upon him to the end, and that drew into itself his whole being and all its interests. Here is the point at which the modern mind arraigns Edwards. His vision is of a God absolute in love, and yet that vision in no fundamental sense rules the evolution of his thought. The con-

clusion to which Edwards comes concerning man's world is an appalling contradiction of the original vision and premise. This contradiction would not have been possible if Edwards had conceived the divine perfection in the spirit of his Master Christ. In Edwards's idea of perfection, and in that of his successors, there inheres a fatal defect. This idea of perfection is not what we mean when we apply it to the best of men and then add thereto infinity. In the bulk to which the idea is raised, an immense subtle evil has crept in. Something may be good in God that evil is in me; this is the hidden germ of unhallowed issue in the vast and imposing conception. So much for the New England theology and the divine perfections.

The idea of human freedom entertained by the masters of this school is formal and even superficial. Had they taken Augustine's position here, and held with him that the good will is alone free; had they seen that it is the inevitable tendency of the divine perfection and every other form of moral power to lead the will from bondage to freedom, they might have done permanent service to theology by their theodicy. As it stands, their discussion both of the divine perfection and of human freedom is without substantial originality.

Edwards did not care primarily for the freedom of man; he cared for it because of its relation to the sovereignty of God. Only such freedom could he see as would not conflict with the divine sovereignty. His idea of freedom is simply the unhindered expression of fixed habit either good or bad. There is surely little originality here. Deeper than the power of habit he did not go; nor did he at any time divine the existence in man of a rational order that might overturn worlds of evil habit. Plato had taught that right education consists in taking pleasure, under the rule of fixed habit, in the proper objects of pleasure. Deeper than this Edwards does not go; his discussion does not go behind the pleasures, good or bad, in which men take a habitual interest.

Nathaniel W. Taylor fixed attention upon the power to the contrary in the will. So far, so good; such power is doubtless there; but Taylor has done nothing to make it evident, nothing to show its worth, supposing it to exist. Taylor cares no more for human freedom than does Edwards. He argues in favor

of freedom that he may save man's responsibility, and thus clear God of accountability for the introduction and continuance of sin in the world. Taylor's freedom is formal, and exists mainly for apologetic purposes. Into the real freedom of man, or the point of contact between man's capacity for real freedom and the Divine perfection that works for man's freedom, Taylor had little insight. He was an able and an honest man; at the same time he was under the spell of abstractions. A power to the contrary which in the entire history of man has never been exercised is something to which only the consciousness of an apologist can bear witness. It is no true account of man's spirit, it is an abstraction, a dream. The freedom of man is no such miserable abstraction and dialectical device, it is life concurrent with the truth of things; and the relation of the spirit of truth to a will in error is in such a display of the persuasions of truth that the reasonable soul shall be eventually won by them from bondage to the liberty of the sons of God. Freedom is not the mere possibility to go either of two ways at the fork of which a man may stand. Such an idea of freedom is trivial. Freedom is insight into the true order of existence, susceptibility to that insight, obedience to it, and harmonious existence under it. If one is without that insight, one has capacity for it, and the Divine perfection is the assurance that it will be ultimately won.

The relation of Professor Park, one of the acutest masters of the school, to the question of freedom is interesting. Park maintains that the will always is as the greatest apparent good. If this is the case, one of two conclusions follows: If this apparent good is unreal, God is alone responsible for this condition of the individual will; if the apparent good is real good, the individual will is good, and again God is the efficient cause. But how are we to make the transfer from apparent good to essential good? Obviously there is but one answer; it all depends upon the behavior of the Most High. That a mind as alert and acute as that of Park should have been brought to such a pass is indeed strange. It could not have happened if the thinker in question had been profoundly concerned with the free life of man. In that case no one would have been keener in the observation that man's rational nature contains the provision, under the illumina-

tion of experience, of escape from the field of illusion into the world of true eternal good. This rational nature, under the illumination of experience, finds no adequate recognition in the thought of the New England divines; and therefore, here in the sphere of their special activity no less than in their general scheme, their work has passed from power because it was wanting both in originality and in depth.

This ancient theology had in it from the first, and preserved untouched to the end, a fatal contradiction. According to this scheme the world was made by God, and yet the world in its misfortune and misery was condemned by God as if it had made itself. When any good was found in the world, it was at once argued that it was due to God and his sovereign decree; when moral evil and misery and death were discovered in the world, it was argued that they were due to man and his abuse of his freedom. If the divine decree did not include the fall of man, then the world broke from the divine control and remained largely triumphant against God; if the divine decree did include the fall and all the events in human history, then men were obliged to read the character of God from that history. Universal predestination and partial redemption either eventually wreck the scheme in which they meet or they work a woe infinitely deeper, they wreck confidence in the moral character of God. Nothing in the high and serious thinking of men is more melancholy than the perpetual see-saw between the universal decree of God and the universal depravity of man for which the human will is held accountable; between the racial need of redemption and the partial response of God in the gift of grace; between this partial bestowment of the Holy Spirit and the universality of the atonement as held by the New England divines; between the sovereignty of the God of love and the eternal damnation of a vast portion of mankind. In view of this interior inconsistency, both intellectual and moral, the wonder is not that the scheme eventually collapsed, but that it endured so long. In a fair field and no favor, in open and free discussion, it would have gone to the wall centuries ago. Authority, sentiment, despair in the presence of the task of finding a better philosophy, fear lest precious things should be exposed to peril if reason took a bolder range,

and the conservative instinct in man, doubtless combined to protect and perpetuate this crude scheme; still, to authority, to the absence of full freedom in the Christian Church, this creed is chiefly indebted for its thousand years of gloom.

It must be said that in much of its thinking the New England theology was artificial. By this I do not mean that it so appeared to these thinkers, but simply that their method led them away from human life. Few things are more dreary than the New England discussions on the atonement. Till Bushnell arrives upon the scene—and he is not in the New England circle, he is the prophet of another order of ideas—the atonement in all the phases of its presentation was as nearly destitute of ethical value as anything could well be. The moral governor of the world, under whose government sin came into the world, could not forgive it until a life of infinite worth had been offered as a satisfaction to the majesty of violated law. This was the central proposition round which the dreary and dead debate proceeded. A moral God played only a nominal part in the scheme, a Father in Heaven had no part in it, the spiritual nature of the soul was ignored by it, and it never even got a glimpse into the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus. Of no other section of New England divinity can one say without some qualification that it is a simple rubbish heap of dead opinions. Anything can be taught in a divinity school by heroic scholars, and anything can be studied and understood in part by persistent students; but ideas there are that cannot be preached with any degree of interest where men are ethically sound and mentally sane. The record of the ways and means whereby able and good but misguided men tried to force successive generations of believers into emotional states answering to the requirements of the governmental theory of the atonement is a record of the rankest kind of unreality. It is not to the point to say, what indeed is true, that there are worse forms of the doctrine of the atonement than the governmental. The contention is that here is one reason for the passing of the system from living interest. At a point of infinite depth, the relation of the human soul in sin to the Eternal Goodness, it had thoughts only legal, forensic, mechanical.

Indeed, it may be said that every historic phase of the atone-

ment except the moral phase reveals uncured the malady of the human mind to which Jesus spoke his healing gospel. That malady is the issue of a false conception of the character of God. The sacrificial systems of the world were built upon the idea that the divine power must be placated if sinful man would be forgiven. Propitiation is at the heart of them all; and so deep into the mind of the most enlightened races has this hideous distortion of the character of the Eternal Father gone that the gospel of Christ perfected in his death as the servant of truth and love, and attested thereby, would probably have failed of gaining a governing influence over those to whom it was addressed had it not been translated by the apostles into the sacrificial language of the people of Israel. The soundness of this remark is confirmed by the purpose and method of the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews. That great writer discovers the pure spirituality of the gospel of Christ, its transcendence of the old sacrificial system of Israel; and yet in order to be understood in this endeavor he is compelled to translate this transcendent and spiritual faith into the language of priest, altar, and sacrifice. Thus deep was the mental malady in the apostolic age. And here we see clearly how that which is central and most precious in the gospel of Jesus, his idea of the eternal fatherly love of God, was endangered by this translation into the unclean idiom of the world. For the historic forms of the atonement are a chapter in religious pathology; they have a great and a pathetic human interest. They discover abysmal depths in man; they disclose the vastness and wildness of man's world. At the same time they contribute nothing toward the positive showing of the way in which the soul escapes from its sin. They build upon the old notion which Jesus came to displace. In their successive forms they perpetuate the idea that God is essentially unfriendly to poor, erring mortals, that he requires to be appeased by some offering, propitiated by some costly sacrifice, or satisfied in some public relation of his character, before he can lift into hope a penitent child. From the point of view of the conception of God as Father, the group of ideas perpetuated in all phases of the atonement except the moral phase are the worst blasphemy ever offered to the Most High. They come from religion as conceived and

operated by the priesthood of the world; they are contradicted and set at naught by religion as conceived and presented by the greater prophets of the race, and supremely by the supreme prophet, Jesus of Nazareth. His parable of the Lost Son is his version of his own heart; his version, too, of the heart of God. The idea that heals the malady of the human mind is the idea of God in the teaching and life and death of Jesus. In this recurrence upon the supreme idea of Christian faith the New England divines do not count. They did nothing, at this momentous point, to deliver man from his blasphemy against God; unwittingly they did much to confirm him in unworthy thoughts of the eternal lover of men. The free world of today has no thanks for them here; in strict truth they deserve none.

One of the ablest treatises in the New England divinity is Doctor N. W. Taylor's book, *The Moral Government of God*. President Porter informs us that "the Moral Government of God was the great thought of Doctor Taylor's intellect." "It occupied his mind more than any and every other subject." I read this treatise while a student in the seminary more than thirty years ago, and I was then greatly impressed with its power. I have been reading it again, and I still recognize the ability shown in it. The plan of the work is large, the discussion is thorough and coherent, the order reminds one of the successive deductions in the ethics of Spinoza, the clearness, energy, and precision of statement are beyond question. But, when all this has been said, it must be added that the work is essentially artificial. It is a discussion largely in the air, away from the great realities and forces of human life; it is abstract, dialectical, going mainly in the strength of presuppositions, wanting in concreteness, wholly wanting in the scientific spirit. It is divided into three sections: first, the Moral Government of God in the Abstract; second, the Moral Government of God in Nature; third, the Moral Government of God in the Scriptures. The analogy upon which the work is constructed is civil government. For Doctor Taylor God was a sovereign ruler after the pattern of civil rulers upon earth. This was the thought that chiefly occupied his intellect; and the idea which is basal in Christianity, and the heart and soul of its message, the idea of the Eternal Father, had no perceptible

influence upon this thinker in his chief contribution to the theological thought of his time. If New England divinity, in the hands of one of its greatest representatives, could be so much in the air, so far away from man's moral world, so unaware of the supreme conception of the gospel of Jesus Christ, it should not seem strange that among weaker men it became still more unreal.

One of the great merits claimed for the New England divinity was its distinction between natural and moral ability. All men had the natural ability to repent of their sins and perfectly to keep the law of God; all men were without the moral ability, that is the willingness, to repent of their sins and to meet their perfect obligation to the law of God. There is perhaps some merit in the distinction. There is an impulse, often enough unliberated, in the rational nature of the soul, a reserve of energy in the form of capacity below the structure of evil habit, to which the Christian appeal may sink. If looked at in this way, the distinction may be considered valid. The whole capacity of the soul is not expressed in the current bad character. There is a capacity beneath the actual evil character, to which the sovereign moral appeal may come; a capacity which, when spoken to with might, may become a blazing power in which the evil character is consumed. But this was not the way in which the New England divines were in the habit of regarding the distinction. It was mainly an apologetic device in aid of the theologian when he was hard pressed in other parts of his system. Why should God involve the whole race with Adam, and thus necessitate a first choice that was evil and an endless succession of choices all bad? The reply was, there was no necessity in the case; man had the natural power not to sin, the natural ability perfectly to meet the demands of moral law. Why should God elect only a portion of this fallen race to salvation, and thus exclude the rest? The reply was that God does not exclude the rest; they have the power to repent of their sins, to believe on Jesus Christ, to cast themselves upon God for salvation and be saved. But no man comes to God unless he is under the influence of the Holy Spirit, and why should the non-elect be left beyond the pale of the Spirit's influence? The reply is that they are without excuse in not coming to God without

the special aid of the Spirit, seeing they have the full natural ability to come. Thus ran the wretched riot of dialectical unreality. Professor Park, when he came in the course of his famous lectures to the discussion of natural ability and moral inability, was in the habit of remarking to his class with grim humor,

Ye who have tears to shed,
Prepare to shed them now.

The memory of that wild wilderness in which was no living thing, not even scorpions or flying plagues, a wilderness predestined never to rejoice or blossom as the rose, is indeed a memory of the dire distress of the Christian Church in New England.

Another conspicuous defect of the New England divinity was its restricted use of human reason. With all its confidence in reason and its bold rationalism in certain fields of inquiry, it set fixed bounds to the operation of free thought, saying, Here shall thy proud waves be stayed. It inherited the unholy distinction between natural and revealed religion; it gave free scope to the human mind only in the sphere of natural religion. The Bible, as the record of revealed religion, was indeed the subject of scholarship, historical, textual, interpretative; but when the history was clear, the text settled, and the interpretation fixed, the function of reason was at an end. The result must be accepted, whether it was the story in the Book of Exodus about God's hardening Pharaoh's heart that he might destroy him, or the account in the Gospels of Christ's surrender of life for the good of the world. Theology became a construction of texts from all parts of the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures. The leading doctrines—predestination, election, depravity, propitiation, forensic justification, the limitation of moral opportunity to this life, the everlasting punishment of the wicked and the heavenly life of believers—were found in texts in all the books of the Bible, which were accorded equal value wherever found. If the moral sense revolted at the result as set forth in Emmons's sermon on Reprobation, or the doctrine of election advocated as baldly by N. W. Taylor as by any of the school, so much the worse for the moral sense. Here is Scripture properly interpreted, and here is the result; accept or reject it, there it stands, and from its finality there is

no appeal. A theology constructed in this way built into itself the soul of revolt, the sure prophecy of its own ultimate destruction. There can be no forced results of an abiding character in the sphere of thought. Coercion is something to which the human intellect cannot permanently surrender. Authority itself is bound to become the subject of arrest, trial, and judgment. While that day is deferred, the Bible stands outside the process of the critical intellect, and from its vast compass the system of traditional dogma may be established. But the thing established on authority can last only while the authority lasts; when the authority decays, the superstructure of dogma falls to the ground.

As we look back from our own free world, this restriction of reason to a particular field, this exclusion of it from the field of profoundest moment, seems very strange. Why did these men fail to learn from the process of the Holy Spirit in their own souls? Why did they not see that life is the parent of literature, that wherever God is in the life of men, in their thoughts, feelings, purposes, and achievements, he will necessarily be in their words? In what way did it escape them that man is most of an agent, most of a creative power, when most under the influence of the Spirit of God, and that wherever words carry the burden of the Lord they carry that burden on the active humanity of men? How came it to pass that these acute thinkers did not discern the origin of the monumental parts of the Bible in the human life that God had filled with his eternal presence? Had they faced such questions, the Bible would have opened to them a new and a momentous expanse of human experience, the supreme opportunity for the achieving reason of man.

There is only one answer to these questions. These men conceived of the Bible as chiefly a book of mysteries; the doctrines of revealed religion were at heart mysteries, and the best work of the human intellect was done when the super-intelligible character of the doctrine was exhibited. These doctrines were for faith and not for reason; they were for faith not as all unverified ideas are for faith, but for faith as passing all understanding. The New England divinity was, therefore, in no adequate sense an expression of the free mind; it was not the result of the unrestricted use of reason. It was a compound of

reason and tradition, the mixed issue of freedom and authority. It is not edifying to see Edwards in the full movement of speculation suddenly pause, begin a new section of his essay, and lug into his argument proof-texts from every corner of the Bible to cover the incompleteness of his rational procedure. He who had such high confidence in reason, so wide a vision of its field, and who exercised his own great gift of insight and argument with such fearless vigor, yet never dreamed that the Bible itself is the supreme product of human reason and the supreme field for the exercise of the reason in the service of the spirit. The isolation of the human from the divine by all these thinkers except Emmons was perhaps the source of this limitation, the putting asunder of what God has forever joined. Whatever the cause may have been, the view that finds in the Bible the sovereign expression of reason and the field for the exercise of reason of greatest moment was hidden from Edwards and all his successors; they never gained the least insight into the nature of the revelation recorded in the Bible. That revelation was to them a process singular, unique, different not only in degree but in kind from the life of holy souls among other nations and among themselves, isolated, super-intelligible; an oracle whose message must be accepted even against the protest of the reason and the conscience.

These criticisms apply equally, it need hardly be said, to traditional theology in its entire course. The attitude of indiscriminating reverence toward the Bible was on the part of the New England divines the inheritance of faith. They were in bondage to a book; and while it is the supreme Book to which they were in bondage, the fact that here, in this greatest sphere of the free intellect, they had no dream of the function of the intellect, is another reason why their dominion has passed away. In ideal, in method, and in result they are superseded. Their ideal of the sphere of reason was a meagre and restricted ideal; their method was without scientific temper and sureness; their results were the uncritical compound of error and truth, of essential and valueless, that one might expect. And if these words seem severe, let it be remembered that the holy cause of sound thinking in the interest of religion, especially in the interest of

the Christian religion, has suffered too long from timidity in the presence of great names.

It must be still further observed that, except in a single direction, the New England divinity refused to learn from its adversaries. It did indeed put itself in battle array. It became keenly alert to strategic positions both for offence and defence. Under attack it assumed a more compact and formidable dialectical shape. Comparison between the form which the New England divinity assumed in the hands of Edwards and his immediate successors and that in which it was presented by N. W. Taylor and Edwards A. Park shows that the system in the hands of these later masters gained greatly in dialectical strength. Indeed, Park spent too much of his force here. He had the gift of the dialectician in unsurpassed power. No man in our American world now living will bear comparison with him here. He developed the logical function to the highest point of efficiency; and till they sat under the teaching of Park, students did not know how fascinating the logician could be. Doctor Foster is undoubtedly right in saying that this thinker did the best that could be done with the materials given him.

But if strong opponents thus pressed the New England divinity into better dialectical form in the hands of its later masters, these masters refused to learn materially from their adversaries. Arminianism was deeply concerned with the freedom of the will, and with the reality of man's responsibility for his deeds. New England Calvinism met this deep moral concern with ill-concealed logical contempt, with the ghostly distinction between natural ability and moral ability, and with the poor verbalism of the power of choice to the contrary, which, apart from electing grace, in the entire history of mankind had never once been exercised. New England Calvinism under pressure of the moral soundness and passion of Arminianism never once faced, in scientific temper, the question of human freedom; it continued to treat this burning issue dialectically; it therefore refused to learn from an adversary less powerful than itself in intellect, but upon the question in debate morally deeper and truer far to the consciousness of normal men.

Equally persistent was the refusal to learn from Unitarian-

ism. Unitarianism was regarded as the supreme form of heresy. Unitarianism so wounded devout feeling for Jesus Christ, so struck at what it regarded here as superstition, appeared so indifferent to that which the New England divines conceived to be the essence of the Christian faith, that they are not without excuse in their attitude of exclusion. But while they are not without excuse, they are without justification. They failed in the presence of an immense opportunity. For it has become obvious to competent judges in all denominations that Unitarianism in the hands of Channing and his successors rediscovered the Christian doctrine of man. This is a service for which immortal thanks are due; and, as is generally the way in cases of this kind, the thanks are expressed by silent appropriation on the part of all enlightened religious bodies of the idea thus rediscovered, not only with no recognition, but with even aversion, for the rediscoverers. To be sure, the Unitarians were quick to follow with a similar device. They took over into their body of thought without acknowledgment and without reasoned insight the heart of Trinitarian theology; they put into God the Father the content of character and pity found in the Second Person of the Trinitarian faith; they gave what they had taken a new name and nothing more. Our business here, however, is not with the weakness but with the strength of Unitarianism in relation to the exclusiveness of the New England divinity. In the face of the self-evident and glorious humanism of Jesus revived by the Unitarian movement, the masters of the traditional divinity presented on the whole a closed mind. In no perceptible degree did it influence their doctrine of man. He still continued from birth to conversion and adoption a lost soul and no child of God. Here the failure of the New England divines meant disaster to their cause. They lost the chance to appropriate the Christian doctrine of man, to affirm two incarnations, one in all men because they are children of God, the other in Jesus Christ as the supreme Son of God; one universal, and the other ideal, in the light of which the universal is to be understood. They lost the chance to renew in a deeper and surer way their doctrine of Christ and their doctrine of God through the new doctrine of man. This, I take it, is one of the greater mistakes of the tra-

ditional divinity. It never did see the value of man; it could not take in that value when brought to its attention by its Unitarian adversaries; it did not dream of the fruitfulness for christology and theology of a new consciousness of the worth of man. It was essentially, if the paradox may be pardoned, an inhuman humanism; it went to the wall finally because untrue to the teaching of Jesus concerning man and God. Properly understood, Unitarianism is the complement of Trinitarianism no less than its rival; that is, if the Trinitarian belief in a social God is to live, it must be matched with the Unitarian faith in a social humanity. Further, there must be between the two sets of beliefs action and reaction if they are to come to their full development. If with the Trinitarian we say God is Father, with the Unitarian we must say man is the inalienable child of God; if with the Trinitarian we claim that there is a special, ideal incarnation of God in Jesus Christ answering to his vocation in the history of religion in the earth, we must contend with the Unitarian that there is a universal incarnation in mankind in virtue of which man is man with the impulse of the Eternal in his heart. In failing to see in the positive message of Unitarianism the complement to what was highest in their own faith and the correction of its malady of errors about man, the masters of the New England theology made a supreme mistake.

Universalism was the third stout antagonist of the New England divinity. It met with the exclusiveness which had been meted out to Unitarianism. Besides, a special scorn fell upon it because of its deficiency in scholarship and in intellectual power. There was, it must be admitted, some excuse for this attitude toward the new doctrine. In its early and popular forms Universalism was more concerned in getting all men to heaven than in getting them into a fit condition to enjoy heaven when they arrived there. Nothing could be more shocking to the majestic moral sense of the Puritan than popular Universalism's easy ideas about sin, its shallowness upon every question of conscience, its conversion of the most worthy Judge Eternal into an infinite, indiscriminating sentimentalist. From the first Universalism was a great interest, but for many years it was an interest poorly served. It came as a protest against an inhuman view of God; it was not

accompanied by a deep concern about personal righteousness. It spent too much of its force in denunciation of the orthodox God, and not enough upon the character of the universalist man. It did not go deep enough to see that man has but one interest, and that is righteousness. If it had seen this and seen it whole, it could have repeated with tremendous power the words of Socrates, "There is no evil can happen to a good man, whether he be alive or dead," and the kindred words of Paul, "All things work together for good to them that love God." If Universalism's doctrine of the future had risen up out of the heart of its passion to make man righteous, its power would have been greater far. As it stood, it did not call for strenuous moral manhood.

This was an unutterable offence to the masters of the New England theology. This unfortunate circumstance concealed from them the real question raised by Universalism—the moral character of God. If they had been wise, they would have taken Whittier's "Eternal Goodness" as the form of the doctrine profitable for study; if they had been prophetic, they would have seen how the admission into their theodicy of the main contention of Universalism, the love of God for every soul that he has made and his everlasting purpose to pursue with his redeeming grace all souls in all worlds, would have given it new range, reality, life, and worth. For here again the heresy was the complement of the orthodoxy. The only original element in the New England divinity was its theodicy; that theodicy with the insight of Universalism left out was meagre and hopeless; with this insight included as a principle of revision and extension, the theodicy would have been living and potent today. For Universalism has brought forward the larger view; and the larger view has proved to be the worthier view. No interest of morality is endangered by the faith that the Infinite works, and works eternally, for the perfect righteousness of every human soul. It will be seen, I think, that the moral hope of the race is grounded upon this faith.

This inhospitality of the New England divinity toward new and reconstructive ideas, together with the other defects noted—its traditionalism, its inclusion of fatal contradiction in its own heart, its artificial mode of thought, and its restricted use of reason—kept the system stationary in a swiftly growing world. It fell

from power because it was found beneath the best religious consciousness of the time. It was found to be outgrown in two fundamental ways; it was outgrown in knowledge and in ethical conceptions. A brief statement of fact is sufficient to show that it was outgrown in knowledge. It knew nothing of the application of the methods of free historical inquiry to the Bible. It never took the position of the scientific historian regarding the rise and character of Biblical ideas. Of the Bible as it emerges from the study of the just and devout scientific scholar, the New England divinity was simply ignorant. Its view of the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures was outgrown. In regard to the natural history of man it was overtaken by the same fate. The theory that runs the many different forms of existence in the world today back to a common primitive vitality, that traces the wide-branching tree of life downward to one original root, they refused seriously to entertain. Adam was for them the head of the race, behind which they did not care to go. To the last, in spite of the new vista introduced by evolution, the New England divines continued to build their doctrine of man upon a Hebrew myth. These men, with all their acuteness and power, were essentially provincial in their outlook upon the world. In general they knew next to nothing of the world of fruitful ideas in the philosophy of the Greeks and Germans; nor did they know deeply the best things in French and English philosophy. When compared with the greater systems of thought, their system was a poor and meagre formalism. The riches of the intellectual life of the world lay largely outside their scheme. In general, of this world of wealth these men were unaware. In the few instances, like that of Henry B. Smith, where knowledge was ample, it meant nothing for the system of theology. Nor was there anywhere large knowledge of the great religions of the race outside of Christianity, nor the least sign of a scientific temper toward them. Among the New England divines there is no such book as that of Maurice on the *Religions of the World*. In consequence of this limitation of outlook to their own religion, they were unable to disengage in it the eternal from the temporal. They were almost as much concerned about miracles as they were about the life of God in the Christian soul. They never rose to the

position from which the scholar sees that, while miracles are the concomitants of all the religions, they are essential to none; that religion is essentially the life of God in man, and where God's life as infinite love is purest and richest, as in Jesus Christ, there religion exists in its supreme form and power.

That the later New England divines should have allowed themselves to be outgrown in knowledge is a surprise; that they should have allowed themselves to be outgrown in ethical ideas in something of a reproach. Such is the fact. Edwards's vision of God, that upon which his rapt soul fed, that in whose strength he lived his great life, is destitute of reconstructive influence upon the Calvinism which he adopts and defends. The system of Edwards as a philosophy of man's world, upon the assumption that God exists and that he is absolutely good, is morally incredible. It is beneath the moral consciousness of the average respectable person in any civilized community. Hopkins's ideal of a disinterested soul is great, and of enduring and pathetic value, yet it in no way enabled him to read the character of the Eternal in terms consonant with an enlightened conscience. The doctrines of the fall, ensuing universal depravity, and obligation to obedience where only the ghost of power was conceded to exist in natural ability, limited election, limited bestowment of saving grace, and eternal punishment for all who were found impenitent at death, are as a whole a body of teaching entirely outgrown by enlightened men. It would indeed be the supreme miracle, the contradiction of the solemn order and best hope of mankind, if a system thus found to lie far below the moral consciousness of enlightened persons should still maintain its ascendancy over them. The New England divinity fell from its ancient throne because it was found inadequate in knowledge and inferior in moral ideas. Its greatest oversight I reserve for remark later, its failure to read the character of the universe by the sovereign fact in its faith, the character of Jesus Christ.

III.

It is high time to change the tenor of remark, since this discussion is not wholly a diagnosis of the causes of death, nor altogether an obituary of the New England theology. It is high

time to call attention to the surviving worth in it, to the eternal soul that we recognize all the more clearly that the old formalism in which it lived has passed away. This precious survival is both subjective and objective, a tradition of great men devoted to the supreme human interest, and a cluster of shining and imperishable ideas.

When the general growth of the community in knowledge has rendered obsolete a previous system of thought, it is the easiest thing in the world, and one of the cheapest, to underestimate the intellectual power of the masters of that system. From this sort of ruthless inhumanity fair-minded men recoil. Progress calls for the conservation of every kind of noble power, and among the noblest kinds of power is the authentic tradition of great minds, enthusiastically devoted to the discovery and the defence of the ultimate meaning of man's world. The person who can read the greater treatises of Edwards without perceiving that he is in contact with an extraordinary intellect is not to be envied. Edwards impresses the honest and competent student as a mind of uncommon acuteness, massiveness, and depth. He is amazing in the fertility and force of his argumentative power. He approaches the character of the Platonic philosopher as a "spectator of all time and all existence." Under idioms of belief and speech that are outgrown, it is easy to recognize speculative genius of a high order, and pervading the speculation the passion of a great religious genius. The image of this great thinker on the banks of the Connecticut or among the Berkshire hills is an abiding consolation to all serious students of man's great and tragic world. And the higher the student rises in intellectual power and in moral passion, the more massive and beautiful in his imagination will the great figure of Edwards loom.

Few preachers are so highly trained as to be incapable of learning anything concerning the prophetic function from the works of Joseph Bellamy. He was a Connecticut pastor, in many ways isolated from the great world of learning; yet in his isolation he annexed the fortunes of the race to his parish, and fixed in it a large vision of the universe. This man's ministry was not concerned with the organization of clubs nor with serving tables. It was free from the pettiness that is the curse of the ministry

in our time. It was occupied with the dispensation of the Eternal, and made its power felt in every parish and in every academic centre in New England. It knew, too, the art of sound reasoning and clear, effective speech. It remains a tradition of intellectual and moral power fitted to aid materially today in recalling preachers to the exalted possibilities of their vocation.

Of Samuel Hopkins, Dr. Channing writes:

He was an illustration of the power of our spiritual nature. In narrow circumstances, with few outward indulgences, in great seclusion, he yet found much to enjoy. He lived in a world of thought, above all earthly passions.

It is not strange that out of such a soul should have come the loftiest piece of moral idealism in the literature of our country. His essay on the Nature of True Holiness is indeed a kind of classic upon the life of the spirit and the height to which a great soul may soar. Here was a mind that had found the supreme secret of existence; that had found it in the world of love and service, girt about with privation of every kind and pitiless misunderstandings. Channing further relates of this master:

I preached for him once, and after the service in the pulpit he smiled on me, and said, "The hat is not made yet." On my asking an explanation he told me that Dr. Bellamy used to speak of theology as a progressive science, and compared the different stages of it to the successive processes of making a hat. The beaver was to be born, then to be killed, and then the felt to be made, etc. Having thus explained the similitude, he added, "The hat is not made, and I hope you will help to finish it."

The devout wish was fulfilled in Channing, and still it is true that "the hat is not made." This sense of the incompleteness of the work of his hands, of the work of his generation, is indispensable to the thinker in every science; it is indispensable to the thinker in the science of theology, and it is the precious inheritance from the New England divines.

Nathanael Emmons is a unique figure in the history of the New England divinity. He was a master in the construction of great sermons, many volumes of which were published and for two generations had an extensive circulation. He was a thinker, acute, fearless, formidable; a teacher of theology who

trained and sent into the ministry more than one hundred preachers; a theist whose vision of God carried him at times into pure pantheism; a splendid patriot and a great man, whose more than ninety-five years of existence in this world is a tradition of many-sided power, of power, too, in a country minister, difficult to match, and still more difficult to surpass, in the history of any community. For the daring mind of today Emmons has a peculiar fascination. His sermons on Divine and Human Agency recall Spinoza. His terrible sermon on Reprobation discovers the impossible side of every system of pantheism. In this and in other sermons of a like nature Emmons will tolerate no disguises. He is absolutely frank and fearless. It was indeed a great community that could accord complete freedom to the man who thus turned New England Calvinism into pantheism. Here is an example of Emmons's manner:

Since the Scriptures ascribe all the actions of men to God as well as to themselves, we may justly conclude that the divine agency is as much concerned in their bad as in their good actions. Men are no more capable of acting independently in the one instance than the other. It is God who worketh in men, both to will and to do in all cases without exception. He wrought equally in the minds of those who sold and in the minds of those who bought Joseph. He wrought as effectually in the minds of Joseph's brethren, when they sold him, as when they repented and besought his mercy. He not only prepared these persons to act, but made them act.

This man had the courage of his convictions, and from him we learn that freedom in New England Congregationalism did not begin yesterday.

Nathaniel W. Taylor has come in for his full share of criticism in this discussion, nor am I able to agree with Doctor Foster in his estimate of the importance of this thinker. It would, however, be a manifest injustice to refuse to recognize his eminence. It is hardly possible to read his work on *The Moral Government of God* without admiration for his penetration, his method of exposition, his logical alertness and skill. Once more we have in Taylor the example of an eminent mind lifted into great efficiency through severe and continued discipline. Such intellects shed upon ordinary minds something of their own grandeur; and their

steadfast diligence, their unslackening and arduous toil in the service of their cause, is a tradition that wise men will not willingly let die.

In Edwards A. Park, whom the writer knew, the most striking characteristic was the native force of his intellect and the degree of brilliant efficiency to which it had been raised by prolonged and consummate discipline. For skill and power in deductive argument Professor Park has never been surpassed by any thinker in our history. If the stuff in which he dealt had been as good as the manner in which he handled it, Park would have been irresistible. His weakness was that of his school, material weakness; in formal skill, finish, and power he stood at the head of his school. It is indeed to be regretted that the memory of such gifts for logical discussion as those possessed by Professor Park, gifts that resembled immense logical instincts raised by long and energetic practice into marvellous efficiency, should become dim. Park's excellence here was a kind of object-lesson in the intellectual world. Through this excellence he became the greatest teacher upon serious subjects that the country has ever known; and the tradition of this keen, accomplished, and powerful mind is too valuable to be permitted without protest to pass into oblivion. In the dauntless intellectual bearing and militant power of the entire New England school there is much to interest and instruct the teacher and preacher of Christianity today. In respect of intellectual magnitude and discipline, we may well say,

We are scarce our fathers' shadows cast at noon.

There is an objective survival in the New England system that as a system has perished. Certain abiding principles are concealed in the passing forms like wheat in the chaff. Criticism here is a process not of extinction but of winnowing. This process leads to a clearer possession of the substance of faith that has been in the Christian Church from early days, and that will remain in it so long as it shall have a gospel to offer to mankind. Sovereignty, sin, judgment, redemption, and the everlasting worth of the human soul, under fresh interpretation and with richer content, are to emerge from the critical process as the new five points of faith. While men believe in the infinite Mind, while

they believe that the infinite Mind is almighty Love, they must continue to believe in the sovereignty of God. Something must be sovereign in this universe. Is it blind fate or intelligence; brute power, aimless, unconscious, or spirit? These are the alternatives, and while faith is sane she cannot hesitate in the choice of her ultimate principle. To be assured that the final sovereignty in this universe is the sovereignty of character, righteous and competent, would be the infinite consolation, to be able to believe in this sovereignty must continue to be the supreme privilege, of Christian faith.

Against the moral idealism of the world there stands forth the tremendous fact of sin. Whether traced to Adam or to a pre-human ancestor in no way alters the fact. The ape of evolution brings into human history the same problem brought by the Adam of the traditional theology. The cry of man in his moral pain is still, Who shall deliver me from the body of this death? The intellect in the service of the conscience still presents its vision of the good; the intellect in the service of the animal still presents its vision of apparent good; and between these visions of good essential and good apparent the soul of man is still in distress. In this sense the race of man is still sold under sin. Moral ignorance, perversity, misery, continue to be the deepest and darkest woes in human history. The only adequate name for man's world is tragedy. The theology that would save itself from shallowness and contempt must renew its vision of sin. Old definitions may be inadequate, old derivations may be antiquated, ancient treatises on original sin may have become mere black mythologies; still, between the soul and the eternal good stand the terrible forms of human ignorance, perversity, weakness, and woe. Into this tragic world of man ancient thinkers looked with profound vision; that vision must be renewed by the thinkers of this modern time who would know what man is, and what he needs in order that he may become what it is in him to be.

The judgment of the eternal God is essential to a living and militant faith. All kinds of behavior cannot be equally pleasing to God if he is a being of moral discrimination, nor can any soul fall outside the circle of his judgment if every soul is of infinite

consequence. The sense of the judgment of God issues in two feelings, one of awe in the presence of the final test of character, the other of hope, that the soul in its evil habit should be of concern to the Infinite. Here the ideal of the saint is renewed; here the hope of the sinner is revived; here in both saint and sinner the consciousness of the infinite dignity of human life is wrought into new intensity and majesty. So long as men believe that the world is under the judgment of God, so long will awe and hope, and the sense of the high import of man's life, continue in the earth. If faith would be permanent, it must include belief in the eternal righteous judgment of God.

Redemption is a word for which we in this day have little fondness. In so far as this means a revolt from ancient ideas about the moral distress of men, it is justifiable; in so far as it signifies that we belong to the respectable and comfortable class in society, secure in our moral conceit, it is not creditable. Redemption has meant deliverance, deliverance of man from his distress by the almighty help of God; and in Christianity it has signified the same thing through the career of Jesus Christ and his servants. If there be no redemption, there can be in our theology no principle of it. If there be no redemption, the world still waits for the advent of its supreme helper.

Under new names the old principle of redemption is in fact more widely accepted and more efficiently used today than at any time since the apostolic age. Our optimism is nothing but our confidence in the coming deliverance of man. Our enthusiasm for education, missions, social service, pure politics, good government, true religion, and a hundred aspects of the Christian ideal, is at heart a new confession of confidence in the great idea of redemption. We are seizing an old idea, delivering it from its mythological setting, clearing it of its aeonian narrowness, translating it into a richer and vaster conception, and making it the final platform upon which as servants of the ideal we take our stand. And with these four beliefs—sovereignty, sin, judgment, redemption—there goes that in the permanence of the human soul. This belief is today, in the great centres of intellectual life, in many cases timid, apologetic, hypothetical. A profounder faith in God as the infinite lover of men, and a deeper life in his

love, will restore this great belief. It is bound up with the consciousness of the moral dignity of man; while that lasts, it cannot perish; when that waxes in vigor, it will return in power. The mystery of the enswathement of the human spirit in flesh is great. It has been obvious to the thinker since thought began. It has been dwelt upon with peculiar intensity, sometimes with exclusive attention, during the last two generations of thinkers. The deeper mystery of the enswathement of the human spirit in God has faded from the consciousness of the time. It is this mystery that contains the key to the other, as Emerson sang,

Lost in God, in Godhead found!

We may believe, therefore, that the New England theology will have this reproduction of its essential ideas, at least, in the new evangelical creed of the future. The old five points of the Calvinistic divinity might not be able to recognize the image of themselves as reproduced in the new five points of the divinity of today; but it is not seldom thus in the preservation of continuity. The principle of inheritance is often obscured in that of variation, the law of parenthood is frequently lost in the advent of a fresh gift from God. It may prove to be the case that the traditional theology has, in a general way, set a type from which the Christian mind as a whole will never depart. A few remarks concerning the possible forms of this persisting type may not unfittingly close this discussion.

IV.

Types of thought fundamental in their nature endure. The Platonic type of idealism endures, the transcendental type, whether Plato is regarded as an adequate master of it or not. The Aristotelian type of idealism endures, the immanent type, that which finds in the eternal the force that gives meaning and character to the world of fact, whether the method and conclusions of Aristotle are or are not looked upon as acceptable. Materialism has many forms, but the type endures. Mind is referred to that which is lower than itself; the highest in human experience is under the ultimate sovereignty of the lowest, and

this again is in bondage to an abyss out beyond the individual soul. This is the essence of materialism, and this way of reading the meaning of existence endures. Pure phenomenalism is a persistent type, the type that regards our human world as a vagrant, mean or mighty, in the dark immensities by which it is surrounded. In the sphere of ethics we have epicureanism, ancient and modern; stoicism, old and new; Hellenism, with its matter and form in ideal synthesis; Christianity, with its temporal filled with the eternal spirit. For many generations, at least, there will continue to exist different types of theological thought. These different schools of thought will continue to be influenced by ideals widely unlike. If we should say that the common ideal of theology is to give to the reason an adequate account of the religious life of mankind, that life is itself smitten with multiplicity and contrast. For critical students there must be some one religion which shall commend itself as highest. For the student who is a thinker, that one highest religion will issue an ideal in the light of which he will build his philosophy of the spiritual life of mankind. For a long time, in the sphere of the philosophy of religion as in other departments of the philosophy of human existence, we must endure multiplicity and contrast; we must seek to learn from them, and through this wider mutual understanding do something to bring on the day of ultimate simplicity and unity in the religious vision of the world.

Every form of theism is founded upon a humanistic interpretation of the universe. The human mind finds itself plus infinity in the universe. Matter is reduced to force, the ordered force is reduced to mind, the mind is the supreme spirit. Thus the cosmos melts before the ardor of the theistic mood into mind. And the same process takes place in the consideration of our human world with a result infinitely richer. Intellect and character in man, moral experience in the societies of men, the moral order in the life of nations and races, the moral world in the history of mankind, terminate in the mind and conscience of the moral Deity. In every case, therefore—whether justifiable or not is not now the question—theism is the interpretation of the universe in accordance with the principle of human personality. Theism is essentially and eternally humanism.

Varieties of this theistic humanism will continue to exist. The varieties will be of two kinds; those resulting from fundamental differences in method, and those resulting from different estimates of the historic expressions of the religious spirit. The New England divinity is at heart a variety of humanism. As a type it will endure; as a system of opinion expressive of that type it has passed away. From the new outlook which we have now attained, we see new reasons for this result. The humanism of the New England divinity had two fatal defects, one intellectual, the other moral. It used as its guiding principle governmental analogies; it lived and moved and had its being in civic relations; it read the character of the supreme Mind through these relations, with the inevitable result that God was for it a king, a moral governor, and men were subjects under this king and governor. This was the intellectual defect of the humanism. It was in no sense Christian in its humanistic principle. Jesus says, "Our Father who art in heaven." He adds, "Thy kingdom come"; but the Divine Fatherhood is primary. The parental and filial relation in human life is for Jesus the supreme principle in the reading of the character of God. Jesus speaks of his Father's house. Here again the human home is used as the institution through which the eternal life in God is to be apprehended. The humanism of Jesus is parental and filial; it is essential and everlasting humanism. The humanism of the New England divinity is external, subordinate, temporal. This structural defect runs through the entire system; from the first under this defect the system was doomed.

The moral defect of the New England humanism lies in the terrible negative which it carries in its heart. God creates all; puts all in a world in which all will surely fall into sin; so regards sin that the sinner is doomed to eternal misery; and yet this same God elects to salvation and provides for the salvation of a part only of this lost race. Humanism here falls beneath the dignity of a good man. It justifies the retort of Father Taylor, the sailor preacher of Boston, to the Calvinistic preacher, "Your God stands for my devil." In such a conception of God there is no hint of Christianity; in attaining this conception of God the kind of humanism employed is surely not that found in the prayer of

Jesus on the cross, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do." The New England divinity has perished, therefore, because it was a form of humanism wanting in depth and wanting in worth.

Still, the type of humanism which the system served while it lived endures, and is bound to endure. That type sets a high value upon certain kinds of spiritual experience; it also attempts to read the character of the eternal, not through man the individual, but through man the social being; in other words, it is evangelical in its religious feeling and Trinitarian in its vision of God.

This type of humanism looks upon our world under the form of tragedy. Between good apparent and good essential, the world is still in a profound sense a lost world; that is, it is lost to the divine end and use of existence, and it is a world in which misery, natural and moral, abounds. The experience of Paul when he cried, "O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death," of Augustine in his bitter struggle against a sensual habit, of Luther in his horror in the presence of an apparently impossible moral ideal, is in less emphatic forms and in a general way the experience of awakened men in a Christian community. The great need is moral deliverance, moral hope and peace. When men are delivered from this woe, they naturally become to their fellow-men still in distress apostles, missionaries, preachers, and servants of the gospel of deliverance. The centre of the world is tragedy, and the new insights and the emancipations from old ideas are built round this centre. The new vision of truth to which the descendants of the old creed have come may be the common heritage of the enlightened religious spirit; yet in their case a certain fervor, a unique feeling, a passion as of one living in a world of tragedy, pervades the vision and flushes its calm features into solemnity and hope.

I have said this feeling is evangelical; that is, it is formed with reference to the message and person of Jesus Christ. He occupies the centre of the historic field. This feeling when construed by thought is found to be theocentric in conclusion but christocentric in its method of interpretation; the attachment to the person of Jesus as the bearer and doer of the eternal gospel is ardent and profound. He is the way over which the seeking God and the

seeking soul alike go in the highest religious community, the way in which the seekers meet. The feeling for Jesus on the part of his first disciples is a continuous feeling; the definitions accompanying the feeling may change while the feeling endures. This profound feeling for Jesus is the emotional side of the type of faith served by the New England divinity while it lived. Jesus was God's way toward man, he was man's way toward God; and thus there sprung up in the heart the feeling of the indispensable-ness of the Lord. This sense of his indispensableness issued in a unique state of the heart toward him; and this state of the heart toward the indispensable Master is not weaker, but stronger, in the free descendants of the New England divines.

We turn now from the emotional aspect of the type to its philosophical principle. Here for the sake of clearness it must be said that there is but one mood toward the universe that is non-humanistic. That mood is the agnostic mood. It sees that man must use his own nature in the interpretation of the ultimate reality if he is to attain an interpretation of it, and this the agnostic spirit refuses to do. Every positive view of the universe is attained under the guidance of some aspect of the personality of man used as the principle of interpretation. Materialism, whether crass or refined, is finally the construction of a theory of the universe through the medium of the bodily life; the philosophy that sums up the character of the infinite as unconscious force uses as interpreter one phase of the human personality, will, abstracted from intelligence. Theism reduces itself to two forms, the interpretation of God through man the individual and the apprehension of God through man the social being. The world of facts lies open to the scientific investigator; the world of religious feeling and character lies before the student of religion; the world of spiritual reality in Christianity is in the vision of the competent inquirer upon this branch of history. In each case facts have a determining influence in the selection of the special phase of the human personality to be employed as the principle of interpretation. Certain facts, such as the apparent sovereignty of the lower forces over the higher, appeal to the materialist; other facts, such as the seeming blind might and majesty of the cosmos and our human world, control the mind of the fatalist; other facts

still, such as the indisputable evidence of purpose in the universe, compel the mind of the theist; and once again, there are orders of fact that incline the theist now toward Deism and then toward Trinitarianism. But the facts are impotent without the guiding principle; in every case that is borrowed from the human personality. I repeat, therefore, that every form of theism is a form of humanism. The collapse of the New England divinity has left in power to the future the type of theism known as the Trinitarian type.

It must be admitted that the form of theism most popular today in all the churches is that gained through the use of man the individual. Preachers in all communions have in large numbers turned from Trinitarianism. It is not publicly denied or discarded; it is secretly confessed to have become no part of the working philosophy of religion. This mood will doubtless continue to prevail to some extent in all the churches. For certain minds the interpretation of the universe through man the individual is supremely attractive, because of its apparent simplicity and straightforwardness, its freedom from contradictions, and from the heavy, although at times transfigured, fogs that forever lie on the seas of mysticism. What is known as Unitarianism sets a distinct and persistent type of theism. It is well to recognize its principle of interpretation, its philosophical method, and its enduring fascination for certain orders of mind. It is well to confess that it is one of two rival types of Christian theism, and that today it is winning increasing confidence and support. It should be added that this type of theism holds, inconsistently as it seems to me, that its God is love in his inmost essence, that it carries over into its Deity pretty much the same moral content that one finds in its great rival type. In my judgment this moral content does not belong to it, nor do I think it will remain permanently with the type if it shall continue unchanged; but as matter of fact this moral richness is now there.

The type of theism inherited from the New England divinity is the Trinitarian type. It has not perished, as is sometimes rashly imagined, in the passing of that system. It is imperishable, because it is founded upon the richest and worthiest form of humanism. It is useless to say that the Trinity was invented

to make room in the Godhead for Jesus Christ and for the Holy Spirit of whom he spoke. Perhaps this may be the literal truth; that it is not the essential truth I am persuaded. Even on the surface of the history it is plain that, while the new doctrine of God may have been mainly suggested by the supreme career in the Gospels, that doctrine is logically prior to Christianity, logically prior to historic humanity. Besides, no ancient theologian of the first rank makes room in the Godhead for Jesus; he simply discerns a unique association between Jesus and one phase of the Godhead, the eternal Son, between whom and all men, because they are men, there is an intimate and an abiding association. In recent centuries there is a cloud of confusion resting upon the doctrine of God and the doctrine of Jesus Christ. Into this fog-bank I have sailed elsewhere, and I have no time for another excursion now.

What we are concerned with here is not primarily historic situations, but philosophical principles. The reasons why the Trinity has been abandoned so largely in all communions of Christian faith are mainly two: superficiality in thought, and inability to grasp the principle at work in the entire history of Trinitarianism. Perhaps the two reasons should be reduced to one. If Trinitarianism were seen to be, what it unquestionably is, the result in theistic belief of the use of man the social being as the guide to the being of God, it could not appear to be the sanctified nonsense which it undoubtedly seems to be to many men today. Man by himself is no man. The individual is neither parent nor child, nor lover nor friend. Social man is the being we know; and social man, with his dower of love and his burning moral idealism, is the being whose ground we seek in the Eternal. If the Eternal is a bare individual, it is an impenetrable mystery how he can be a moral being, and we are inclined to conclude with Aristotle that morality, except in the form of intellectual integrity, is foreign to the nature of God. If the Eternal is a pure everlasting egoist, again it passes understanding how he can be represented in an altruistic humanity. That the Deity has the power to create forms of life different from his own, the world of life may be held to prove. Still in every case there is fundamental identity. The link between the nature of

God and the world of matter is force; force being unmeaning save as a phase of will. The infinite variety in the forms of life are again one with God in that he is the living God. When we come to man, we have a being whose essential nature is love. If God does not answer to man here, he falls below the work of his hands. But love, so far as we can see, is impossible except in a social being; if therefore God is lover in some mystic way, he must be social. The question is how to evolve from an egoistic Deity an altruistic humanity. To answer this question of the evolution of humanity is one of the fundamental problems of theism; it would seem to be a desperate problem for deistic theism.

I am here simply stating a principle of faith; I am not arguing now for the truth of a doctrine. The point is that the Trinitarian type of theism has survived the collapse of the old divinity; it will continue to survive, because it is founded on a distinctive conception of man employed as a guide to the being of God. And it should be said, in simple justice to this type—all the more because its friends seem to be few, and these few appear to sit most of the time under the shadow of fear—that the less we think of man the mere individual the less disposed shall we be to rest in the form of theism to which it leads; that the more we regard man as essentially a social being the more inclined shall we be to trust the form of theism toward which it points.

The high contention, therefore, between the Unitarian and Trinitarian types of theism is not ended. It is only at its clear beginning. So far as it has been a contention in enmity it has had its dismal day. The sooner this phase of the debate is utterly transcended the better it will be for the cause of truth and character. A nobler debate now opens, a debate without which the intellect loses half its vigilance and vigor, the struggle in equal honor and utter freedom between the two types of theism. In this invigorating and honorable contest the writer stands in the line of descent from the New England divines. His theism is social theism, he is an out-and-out Trinitarian; at the same time he is moved to confess that he does not find himself in a multitude that no man can number.

Humanism as a philosophical principle covers both varieties

of theism, and theism is after all the sovereign interest of religion. That theism is at heart humanism may be said to be a new insight. That it is not absolutely new, the famous remark of Xenophanes about the way in which animals would construe the universe if they were in a position to construe it clearly shows. Still this form of thought, in its complete self-consciousness, is essentially new. When we construe the Eternal by the human we take the risk of faith. We may be mistaken, yet our mistake is a tribute to the Eternal. We judge him by our best, and add thereto infinity. Humanism is our greatest word because it covers the greatest fact that we know, the phenomenal world of man. This phenomenal world is our surest path to the Eternal. We have no means of getting at what is except through what appears; and the highest appearance is the highest revelation of the hidden reality. Contempt for man's world is contempt for the world of the highest man, Jesus of Nazareth, and contempt for his world is contempt for the Eternal, if the Eternal has equal worth. The phenomenal world is all that we have; nor is it a world isolated, vagrant, desolate. The Eternal is its refuge, and underneath it are the everlasting arms. It is indeed shot through with the imperishable reality whose revelation it is. Here the conscience of the thinker is under infinite bonds; he is under bonds to do well by man's world. The way in which Doctor F. H. Bradley kicks the phenomenal world out of doors in the name and in the interest of a ghostly, anti-human, noumenal world is not calculated to increase respect for his philosophical method nor confidence in his conscience as a thinker. The resolution of the world that surely lies in intellect and feeling, and which has value for intellect and feeling, into something that does not lie in intellect and feeling, and which for both is as destitute of worth as pure negation must always be, is a procedure that must meet with the everlasting protest of the humanist. If we must give up either the phenomenal or the noumenal, let us surrender the anti-human, the noumenal, too poor to deserve respect of any sane soul, and whose poverty is only equalled by its pride. Let us, so says humanism, hold to the reality and worth of man's world, and use it as our surest instrument in our endeavor to ascertain the character of the Eternal.

HELLENISM AND CHRISTIANITY

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The long period of helpless infancy through which the human being who is to survive in the struggle for existence must pass is proof conclusive that from the time when first men were men—and from an even earlier time—they must have lived together in groups. Whether those groups were, as in the case of the gorilla, patriarchal in kind, or matriarchal, as they are seen to be, or may be conjectured to have been, in the case of some tribes very low in the social scale, is still a disputed question. The tendency of those groups, however, was in the patriarchal direction; this tendency strengthens even in times when the tribe is still migratory, and is fully established by the time when the tribe settles down in a fixed habitation as a village-community. From the village-community the city-state develops; an amalgamation of city-states may produce a national state; a national state may become a world-power, and even seek to establish itself as a world-empire.

In each and every one of the forms, just enumerated, through which human society goes, the human beings that constitute it are conscious of the fact that they do belong to it and that strangers do not. As belonging to it, they have purposes and interests in common. Their consciousness of those purposes and interests is a common consciousness or collective consciousness. As common or collective, it is neither confined to, dependent on, nor created by, any single member of the community. It is there when each man is born into it; and there it continues, though any one member be removed by death from the community. It directs and even determines, within limits, the thoughts, the beliefs, and the actions of those born into the community. It is the Custom of the community. It prescribes what each member of

the community may or may not do. It even determines what he shall think and believe. This common or collective consciousness has its own psychology, its own psychological laws, which are distinguishable and ought to be distinguished from those of the ordinary psychology which are gained from study of the individual considered in abstraction from society.

Among the conceptions found in the common consciousness and ever evolving in accordance with the laws of its psychology the most interesting are those of morality and god. Primitive man regards everything which happens to him, or within the range of his observation, as the act of some agent. That is the theory of Animism, established by Professor E. B. Tylor and accepted by all competent to judge. To primitive man the category of cause and effect is unknown, as Wilhelm Wundt has shown in his *Völkerpsychologie*: it is by the concept of act and agent alone that primitive man seeks to explain things. Very naturally, indeed necessarily, in the case of many things the assumed agent cannot be found: he exists but is unknown. His act is a fact, patent to the common consciousness; and he is a power, as is apparent to all; and, if unknown, then he is an Unknown Power. The community collectively is conscious of his existence and his power. To him are ascribed any other acts, i.e. facts, in the case of which the community can find no visible, tangible agent. A relation exists between him and the community affected by his acts. That relation is a bond, a *religio* according to one etymology of that word. And the bond exists in the collective consciousness of the community. It not only exists but it persists. It may persist so long that the unknown power, necessarily conceived as an agent, and so far resembling man, acquires a proper name; and then many more doings are related of him than those which originally attracted the common consciousness to the fact of his existence—he becomes the central figure of myths, an All Father such as is found in Australia, Melanesia, America, Africa.¹

But many of the facts or acts for which primitive man seeks an author are ascribed by him, on what he considers good evidence, to some visible, tangible, material, or animal object. And

¹See A. Lang, *The Making of Religion*; R. Hoffmann, *La notion de l'Être Suprême chez les peuples non-civilisés*.

such an object, or rather the power which manifests itself therein, will take its place in the common consciousness of the community as the power to which the offerings of the tribe may be made and its requests preferred. In either case, whether the power does or does not manifest itself in material form, the community, as a community, has a god. But whereas acts may be ascribed to various animals or material objects, and a plurality of such deities may accordingly arise, if an unknown agent is credited with any one act, any number of further acts may be credited to his account—a multiplication of deities is not necessary. In Australia and other places a multiplication seems not to have occurred. Elsewhere it undoubtedly did.

The god or gods of a nomadic tribe, when the tribe settles down into a fixed habitation, become the deities of the village-community; and, if it grows, of the city-state, and even of a nation. The community of worshippers, even in the last case, remains, if not in fact, then by convention and fiction, a body of men of common race and origin worshipping the god or gods of their fathers and forming a political as well as a religious community. And, if one nation by force of arms establishes its authority over others, it may weld them into one political whole, an empire, as Rome did. A new political community is created; but will a corresponding religious communion be developed? The question admits of no general answer; but what actually happened in the case of the Roman Empire and the Christian religion is coming to be better understood, and is accessible to the general reader in such a work as Doctor Paul Wendland's *Die Hellenistisch-Römische Kultur in ihren Beziehungen zu Judentum und Christentum* (1907), from which this article will borrow largely.

Looking backwards on the chain of historical occurrences, we may be inclined, with the wisdom which is born after the events, to regard that which happened as that which alone could happen in the circumstances, as the necessary effect of the causes at work. But increasing knowledge, and the power which it brings to us of placing ourselves by the use of the historic imagination at the scene and the time of the events, is apt to weaken that impression. We can realize the conditions which prevailed and under which the event took place. But in doing so we also realize that there

were other contingencies which were also, and equally, favored by the conditions.

The Jews of the *diaspora* were widely scattered over the Hellenistic world; wherever they settled their monotheism attracted proselytes from amongst the best type of men; why should they not have converted the world to Judaism? Rome's conquests brought as one of their consequences the irruption of Mithraism into its army and amongst its citizens; its expansive force might well, as Cumont's investigations show,² have spread it over the whole of the ancient world; yet its spread was arrested. Above all, in the time of the Empire, the worship of the genius of the Emperor, as it was the symbol of the unity of the Empire, had at its back not only the whole force of the government but also the whole-minded approval of the governed: what could stay its progress?

These were among the contingencies. What were the conditions under which or on which these and other tendencies had to work? First we may notice one, without which no form whatever of religion could have become common to the whole of the ancient world. It is a very simple condition in appearance. It is merely that that world formed one community, a whole. And what unified it into one whole was not the fact that one and the same political government was imposed upon it, for its unification began before the Roman Empire. That process of unification, so far from being a result produced by the Roman Empire, paved the way for the accomplishment of what, according to Ihering, was Rome's task in the history of the world, that is, the revelation of the idea of a world-empire as superseding the principle of nationality; of a universal religion as superseding all national religions; of one legal system, that of Roman law, as superseding all others. That process of unification is what is known as Hellenism—the process by which Greek culture was brought within the grasp of the non-Greek world, and by which that world was Hellenized. Like the hand of the dyer, a new idea—and still more a new system of ideas, such as that offered by Greek culture to the non-Greek world—must be subdued to what it works in.

²Franz Cumont, *Les religions orientales dans le paganisme romain*. Paris, 1907.

To be received by the ordinary mind it must be lowered to the level of the ordinary mind; or rather perhaps we must say that the ordinary mind grasps as much as it can and in such way as it can—it can only understand a thing by, at least partially, misunderstanding it. The Hellenizing of the ancient world began before Rome's day, with Alexander's attempt—and failure—to establish a world-wide monarchy. Though the attempt failed politically, it did however lay the ancient world open to the "pacific penetration" of Hellenism: the Greek language (or rather the *Koinê*) and Greek modes of thought poured in, and fertilized the area they inundated. Hellenism endowed the ancient world with one culture, not provincial but a *Weltkultur*, inspired with Greek thought and expressed in the Greek tongue.

To say however that the ancient world owed its unification to Hellenism is scarcely adequate. Hellenism made it a new-created world. The possession by the world of a common tongue, the *Koinê*, awoke the world to the consciousness of its common humanity. The Greek distinction of the peoples of the world into "Greeks and barbarians" could not survive in the atmosphere of Hellenism. The only distinction which Eratosthenes could recognize between man and man was not that of Greek and barbarian but that of "good and bad." If Hellenism thus levelled old distinctions, if Hellenistic culture had a levelling tendency, at any rate the distinctions it abolished were distinctions that offended and resisted the growth of our consciousness of our common humanity. In this connection it is no accident and no matter of insignificance that the conception of the *οἰκουμένη* now for the first time appears, transcending differences of race and nation, and furnishing the complement to the conception of a common humanity.

Not only, at the bidding of Hellenism, does this new-created world arise, but in Stoicism we see it in process of becoming conscious of itself. The true state, in the Stoic view, is the *Cosmos*; its citizens are all men, ruled by one divine law; it has no temples or images, the work of man's hands, unworthy of gods; in it there is no marrying or giving in marriage; neither is there any money. Cosmopolitanism, humanity, the brotherhood of man prevail therein. Social distinctions disappear: the woman is

as the man, slaves and masters are unknown, there is neither bond nor free.

The unification of the world of culture, which was the work of Hellenism, was a condition which rendered possible the spread of any form of religion—whether Judaism, Mithraism, or the cult of the Emperor's genius—which had within it power to propagate itself. But a second condition which we must notice—the growth of the individual's consciousness of his own existence as an individual—though compatible with Judaism and conducive to the growth of Mithraism, did not lend itself to the cult of the Emperor's genius; for that was demanded of a man not as being individual and thereby, to the very core of his being, distinct from all other men, but as being a citizen and, as such and in respect of this obligation, indistinguishable from any other citizen—without individuality.

In those forms of ancient society in which the religious community was co-extensive and identical with the political community, individual piety and personal religion had but little room in which to grow, and less encouragement to do so. Compliance with the outward forms was all that was required; and as no further direction was given to the individual, no further step by him was usually taken. But, even so, in some cases individual self-consciousness began to manifest itself; and it showed itself usually in an anxiety about the state of the individual after death. The rise of the Greek mysteries is the first manifestation symptomatic of the growth of the individual self-consciousness. That manifestation was spontaneous and from within. But the impact of external forces drove the movement further. The break-up of states and societies which the growth of the Roman Empire involved carried with it the disintegration, if not the dissolution, of the religious as well as the political communities which those states and societies formed. This process disengaged the individual and set him free. Being free, and being conscious to some extent of his freedom, he immediately set to work to weave new organizations, clubs, societies, social and artistic, which were neither limited by nor dependent on the ancient city-states.³

³T. P. Waitsing, *Étude historique sur les corporations professionnelles chez les Romains*.

If he preferred a political life, all roads led to Rome; and there a career was thrown open to talent. In moral philosophy the claim and significance of individuality and personality was recognized. Ethics generally becomes individual. Epicurus sets forth personal happiness as the end of personal endeavor; and Stoics and Sceptics alike agree with him in seeking the realization of the ideal in the individual apart from society. The ideal wise man of the Stoics, self-centred in his individuality, was immovable by aught external. The personality of Epicurus came to be regarded as a divine epiphany, the revelation of a σωτήρ to the world. Biography now for the first time, and now naturally, makes its appearance in literature; portrait-painting in art; realism in the mimes of Herodas. The professions become differentiated; knowledge—even though research was neglected—was popularized and science “vulgarized.” In poetry, oratory, and history the personal note is unmistakable in Catullus, Horace, Cicero, and Tacitus. The moral corruption of society in Rome produced its reaction; and that reaction took the form of popularizing moral philosophy—that is of bringing it home to the heart of the individual, and putting to individual men the questions, Who art thou? for what intended? called to what? And this work was carried out by preaching in the markets and in the streets. It was mission-work carried on by the Stoics. And its interest for us is that the channels it created were to be filled with Christianity, which through them was to flow with what has hitherto appeared such unaccountable rapidity throughout the Roman Empire.

The Stoic missionary, Epictetus tells us, must have the conviction that he is sent by Zeus as his messenger to men. He must have no property, possessions, or home. If beaten or assaulted, he must love his assailant as his brother. Neither friend nor wife must stay him from obeying the call when it comes to him. This mission-work, it cannot be doubted, predisposed the hearts touched by it for Christianity. It was a *praeparatio evangelii*. It prepared the soil, especially by preaching the doctrine of personal responsibility for wrong-doing. It has left its effects even on the Epistles of the New Testament, as was first shown in detail by Heinrici's commentary on the Corinthians. If we would

have a picture of the Stoic street-preachers, we can reconstruct it from Acts 17, where Paul appears in Athens even as they did: every day he was in the market-place, addressing himself not only to the Jews and devout persons but to all whom he found there, and attracting to his audience even his rival street-preachers, the Stoics and Epicureans. Of such Stoic and Epicurean missionaries many were converted to Christianity; and what Augustine says of those of later times is true of those of the earliest period—the Church did not require them to change their habit or their mode of activity. Naturally too those who went over to Christianity took with them not only their bodily habit but also their intellectual outfit, and necessarily but unconsciously modified their Christianity to go with it. Later, Christianity not only recognized its debt, thus incurred, to heathen moral philosophy, but even exaggerated it: not merely did Tertullian recognize that Seneca was often Christian, but a forged correspondence between him and Paul was produced, and the hand-book of Epictetus was twice edited *in usum Christianorum*.

Thus, then, even before the Roman Empire arose, Hellenism had made the *οἰκουμένη* into one social, one moral and intellectual, community, and had prepared a field alike for Judaism, Mithraism, or the cult of the Emperor's genius. Next, not only was a community, co-extensive with the ancient world, created, but the individual rose to the surface of his own self-consciousness—a new condition in the state of things, and one which was not likely to lend itself to the development of the cult of the Emperor's genius, however much it might encourage the individual to exercise his personal freedom in choosing a religion for himself. Thirdly, we have seen the development of a system of personal appeal on the part of the Stoics, carried out by means of street-preaching—a mode of appealing to the individual which, though devised by pagans in the interests of moral reformation, afforded to Christianity a singularly effective method for its rapid propagation throughout the world.

Thus Hellenism had created a new community, imperfect indeed in its structure, because the unifying force of a common religion was as yet lacking to it, though the bonds of a common culture, intellectual and moral, at present held it together. Yet

the new society was composed, in a sense in which none other yet had been composed, of individuals; and it was for the individual to decide what, if any, form of religion—existing or yet to come—should be common to all members because it was the personal conviction of each individual. The political changes accompanying the growth of the Roman Empire, which had everywhere broken up the city-states, had disintegrated the worship of the city-gods, and even the faith of the ordinary citizen in them. The growth of science and philosophy had, even in pre-Hellenistic times, led the cultured to doubt and sometimes openly to deny the received polytheism; and in Hellenistic times it had even undermined the religion of the people. The human spirit, however, was not prepared to acquiesce in blank and empty negation. It moved first, in its search for something positive and real, in the direction of universalism. The polytheisms of different nations were to lend mutual support and testimony to each other by being shown to consist of the same gods under different names: the world was one community, having not indeed one God but the same plurality of gods everywhere for the object of its universal worship. The movement in this direction, which shows itself in the pages of Herodotus, and which availed itself of the prestige and fabulous antiquity of polytheistic Egypt, appeared to be forwarded in Hellenistic times by the fact that the cult of Egyptian, Phrygian, and Syrian deities propagated itself widely throughout the Hellenistic area. But the very success which it had was fatal to itself: the identification of one god with another, of each with all, and all with each, resulted in something which certainly was a non-polytheism, but which, as it evacuated every deity that was submitted to the process of all distinctive characteristics, yielded but a negative monotheism. One God there was in name; a god indeed of all peoples and nations; a god that could be found by theological speculation, but could not be found where he was wanted, unconsciously perhaps, by the individual seeker—in the individual's own heart.

Doubtless an obscure, though still real, sense of what there was wanting in the abstract and negative monotheism in which the tendency to universalism had resulted both gave rise and gave support to Euhemerism. The bond between god and man,

which in the village-community and the city-state had been felt to exist, and which the decay of polytheism, or rather of worship as it existed in the city-state, had disintegrated, Euhemerism, as a theology, sought to discern in the divine in man, which it saw in the great personalities that overtopped ordinary mortals. The roots of this belief may possibly be traced back to the Greek belief in a man's *daimon*, and to the Greek worship of Heroes. It is belief in the divine power manifesting itself in and through man; but, we may note, it is the outcome of a belief in divine power, not the source or origin of that belief. The first great personality in the Greek world thus recognized as divine was that of Alexander. His successors enjoyed like honor; then in Egypt Ptolemy I, after death, was thus consecrated; and the deification of Roman Emperors eventually and naturally followed. Logically enough, the person in whom the divine power was thus manifested was addressed—before the Christian era—as σωτήρ, *praesens deus*; and his manifestation was spoken of as ἐναργής ἐπιφάνεια. One of the lines on which Christianity was to run, or rather on which it did run, was thus prepared: the world was to some extent trained to the conception, or prepared for the idea, of a Divine Saviour, manifested here and now on earth. How impotent was that conception, taken by itself, is shown by the fate that attended it when it took form in the deification of the Roman Emperors. The spiritual need of the individual who was a member of the moral and intellectual community created by Hellenism was not for an abstract and negative monotheism, but for a personal God to whom he could have access in his own heart. Euhemerism set up a process which was based on the recognition of the divine in man, but which ended by bidding man find God, not in his own heart but in the person of a mortal individual like himself. The conception that such a mortal was a *praesens deus*, an ἐναργής ἐπιφάνεια, was not merely illusory, it was, or rather it proved, derisory. Nevertheless Roman statesmanship—and the statesmanship which could create and maintain the Roman Empire needs no other testimony than that capacity—sought to find in that conception both a visible and outward sign, and also the inward and invisible bond, of the unity of the Roman Empire. This idea was not the artificial product of political

expediency; and it was something more than a piece of Euhemeristic theology gone wrong. To understand it we must call to mind the fact that the stage of religious development reached by the early Italian tribes before they came under the influence of neighboring peoples was very low: their *di indigites* were in a rudimentary stage of development, their belief in the *genius* of each individual man was already deeply rooted. The history of their religion turns on the successive inundations of foreign worships which commercial and political relations with foreign nations brought in their train: by the side of the *di indigites*, the *di novensides*, the "newly settled gods," took their place; first Greek divinities, and then Oriental—Cybele, Bacchus, Mithras, Isis. Religious receptivity was the characteristic of Rome—religious receptivity, indeed, rather than religious activity. This Roman receptivity became in statesmen the tolerance which is religious indifference—a tolerance which, as statesmanship, insists on the importance of religious forms for political purposes, and combines with the observance of forms absolute indifference to the individual's belief or want of belief. Thus at Rome the form of worship was emptied of all content: a vacuum was created, abhorred by nature and to man abhorrent. The consciousness of sin, the desire for expiation, and the need of salvation, which favored, if they did not originate, the growth of Mysteries in Eleusis and elsewhere over the Hellenistic world, were found also in Rome, and the mysticism which springs up from such a soil has left its mark in the Sixth Book of Virgil's *Aeneid*. This feeling of the need of expiation was utilized, for political purposes, by Augustus. His rule was to be recognized as marking the rebirth and renewal of the human race. The expiation was indeed to be national, not individual, and to be marked by ritual elaboration. Horace was called on for a *carmen saeculare*. Temples and priesthoods were restored. Old institutions and old virtues were to be re-established. Virgil was called on to link the greatness of the present with the glories of the past in his *Aeneid*. And yet this attempt to set back the clock failed. Or rather it succeeded; for its real meaning and veiled intention was not to revert to republican times and a republican government, but to facilitate the transition from the Republic to the

Empire by representing the movement as a return to the ancient state of things. The motive throughout was not religious but political. The emperors regularly became *divi*, their *genius* an object of worship. From the dizzy mixture of all kinds of religion—native Italian, Greek, and Oriental—the worship of the Caesar rises, and overtops and overshadows them all. The old Italian belief in the *genius* was thus impressed into the service of political and imperial ends. Combining religious and patriotic sentiment, the worship of the Caesar appeared admirably adapted to unite the peoples, differing in nation and religion, who formed the Empire; to serve as the common expression of their adhesion to the Empire; as the outward and visible mark of the unity of the one and indivisible Empire. But the worship of the Caesar did not revivify the ancient religious beliefs. It placed them in the second rank, and sucked the life's blood out of them. And though it thus deprived them of what vitality was left to them, it gained itself no religious strength thereby. It was a purely external form and act, having no religious content, and affording no satisfaction to the religious instinct.

By the Roman Empire the *οἰκουμένη* was unified into a political whole. By the action of Hellenism it had been endowed with one culture, a *Weltkultur*. What was then still wanting to it was religion. But the demand for religion sprang from the cravings of the individual self-consciousness, the birth of which was a greater event in the history of the world than the rise of the Roman Empire or the growth of Hellenic culture. And the demand for individual, personal religion could not be satisfied by the Caesar-worship which was all that the religious indifference of Roman statesmen could produce to meet the need. Indifference however manifests its better side as tolerance; and the religious tolerance of Roman statesmanship, at any rate at first, allowed the individual to follow his religious instinct as he would. The Stoic propaganda, as we have seen, sought to direct personal piety into a moral rather than a religious channel. Accordingly the religious instinct, when it could not be appeased by mere morality, threw itself largely upon Oriental cults. Better means of communication, military roads, increasing commerce, above all the lengthy stay of the legions in the provinces and on the frontiers

and the steady infusion of the legions with *peregrini*, facilitated the spread of Mithraism, the favorite religion of the soldiers. A god thus worshipped was limited to no city-state and to no one nation: his worshippers formed a community capable of embracing all mankind, capable of producing a universal religion. And the tolerance of Roman statesmanship permitted Mithraism to spread as it would, and as it could.

Judaism also, like Mithraism, though by the action of different forces, had been spread broadcast over the Hellenistic world. But it was the Jews of the *diaspora* and not those in Palestine who alone became exposed to the action of Hellenistic culture. And the way in which Hellenism affected the *diaspora* is manifest and indisputable: not only did the Jews of the dispersion become Hellenized in speech, they absolutely could not understand their own scriptures, save in a Hellenistic version. To a certain extent, even, Greek thought permeated through the barrier of their national exclusiveness; but it was to a limited extent only. If Philo is a conspicuous, he is also a unique, surviving instance of the influence exerted by Greek philosophy on the Jews of the *diaspora*. And as the action of Hellenism on the Jews of the dispersion was small, so their reaction on it was, in effect, trifling. Proselytes who came to them they did accept. But the seed which is to grow in the soil in which it is set must burst in order to grow. Judaism however had become much too rigid for any such expansion; the "cake of custom" had dried and hardened round it till expansion was impossible. What gives later Judaism its peculiar hall-mark? "Is it not," says Bousset (*What is Religion?* p. 158), "is it not religious custom—circumcision, the maintenance of the Sabbath, the tithes, the avoidance of mixed marriages, the laws concerning food, directions for purification, and *not* sacrifice and worship in the temples? Throughout the world a Jew is recognized by these things."

If the Jews of the dispersion were rendered by their tribal exclusiveness incapable of absorbing more than the merest modicum of Hellenic culture, the Jews in Palestine were absolutely beyond the reach of its action. Points of resemblance, indeed, between the Judaic and the Hellenistic worlds there were. But they are resemblances inherited by both from an earlier stage of culture—

a stage which all the peoples of the earth enter, and from which some emerge. One such point of resemblance must here be noted: it is the belief in evil spirits, demonology—a belief found amongst the Jews as well as other people, a belief inherited by Christianity from the Jews. The behavior of such spirits is the same all the world over; everywhere they plague men, and much in the same way. Everywhere they are driven out by exorcists; and for this purpose the use of sacred names was not confined to the Jews and Christians, but was familiar to the heathen also (London Papyrus, ed. Kenyon, p. 67: ἐξορκίζω σε κατὰ τῶν ἁγίων ὀνομάτων). Even in the formulae used a resemblance naturally springs up: *φιμώθητι* is a word specially used in this connection. Sickness is hypostasized (*πνεῦμα ἀσθενείας*), not in the New Testament alone. And the further we depart from the oldest strata of Christian literature the more frequently do we meet with the marvellous. It is only in the more recent strata that Hellenistic influence manifests itself, whether in institutional matters or in mythical realism.

Primitive Christianity, originating as it did in Palestine, stands aloof from Hellenism, uninfluenced by Graeco-Roman culture. It did not seek at first to operate on or through literature. As Wendland says, it did not belong to the Paper Age: Peter, James, and John wrote nothing. The oldest letters are letters, not epistolary compositions. The *Koinê* used is rather the spoken than the literary *Koinê*. Luke first shows any signs of response to the demands of literature and style. The feeling still was that the pagan world with its science and philosophy belonged to the powers of darkness. "Let no man spoil you with philosophy" was the warning issued. It is intelligible therefore that the pagan world, for its part, saw at first in Christianity a barbaric doctrine, hostile to culture.

But if primitive Christianity, cut off from Graeco-Roman culture (or sheltered from it?) made no appeal at first to literati or philosophers, if it ignored or was ignorant of philosophy and literature, it was because its message was to the heart rather than to the mind, to the religious consciousness of the individual. Religion was revealed as based on and manifested in the individual's immediate experience of communion with God. The personal piety

which Stoicism labored by its mission-preachers to stimulate and maintain was to be enabled to find its God. But, though the individual was addressed, he was addressed not as such, but as being, or to be, a member of the Kingdom of God. Released from national restrictions, from the customs which had caked round the religion of the Jews, the Kingdom of God was to provide the community without which, or apart from which, the individual religious consciousness droops, if not withers. As the individual himself cannot exist, or even come into existence, apart from society; as he is born into a common consciousness, neither created by nor dependent on him alone; so the objective facts of his religious consciousness are not peculiar to his experience alone. It is only because they are universal that any individual can participate in them; that they are constituent of the objective and collective religious consciousness; and that the individuals participating in them form a religious communion.

The course of historical events is apt to appear to us, looking back at them, to have had but one order which it could follow. When however we immerse ourselves in the facts, there seldom appears to have been but one direction which they could take. For the spread of Christianity there were two routes, through Jewry or to the Gentiles. The Jews of the *diaspora* lived in strictly organized communities which maintained an active intercourse with the mother-country. What more natural, what more inevitable, than that Christianity should first seek outlet along those lines? Yet it was in those strict communities that Christianity was most bitterly opposed; and, had it succeeded in following those lines, it would have found its course blocked, for the reason that Judaism in effect purchased toleration from Rome at the price of renouncing proselytism. The road through Jewry to a world-mission was thus doubly blocked. Paul's choice was speedy: he turned with little loss of time to the Gentiles, and preached that in the Christian community there was neither Greek nor Jew, nor bond nor free, nor male nor female. The essential unity of the human race, the equality of all men before God, which is correlative to the Christian idea of the one God and was implicit in Jesus' gospel, was brought into the full light of consciousness by Paul. It was a truth which had already

become manifest on its moral side to the Stoics, who were even then teaching that in the true state there is neither bond nor free and the woman is as the man. But the Stoic apprehension of the truth was moral and intellectual. Religious it was not. The Stoic mission-preachers, like the missionary Paul, made their appeal to the individual. But it was an appeal to his moral not to his religious consciousness: "unum bonum est," says Seneca, Ep. 31. 3, "sibi fidere." "Turpe est etiam nunc deos fatigare . . . fac te ipse felicem." The appeal to the Hellenistic world found it also, as we have seen, in possession of the ideas of sin and weakness, of the need of salvation, of a σωτήρ, a saviour and intermediary. But Christianity gave those ideas another content. Asceticism and "other worldliness" were in existence in the Hellenistic world before the time of Christianity; "the simple life" was preached and practiced, as a change, in Seneca's day (Ep. 18. 7; 100. 6).

The representation of Paul's activity in Athens which is given in Acts 17 is of special significance. The account of his preaching in the Areopagus shows that he accepted from the Stoics their theory of man's natural knowledge of God and of man's natural morality. And the version evidently belongs to a period when there was no longer any question or any possibility of Christianity's relapsing into Judaism, no longer any doubt or hesitation as to its universal mission: the Church had always had that mission. How quickly this conviction grew up is shown both by the reception into the synoptists of the words, "Go ye therefore and make disciples of all the nations," "Preach the gospel to the whole creation," and by the consideration that the Fourth Gospel naturally springs from it. The greater importance gained by the Logos doctrine over the Messiah theology is explicable in the same way: Christianity was definitely turned toward the heathen—was consciously become a universal religion. As a universal religion, or in its attempt to establish itself as such, its relations both to the Jews and to Rome were essentially altered. Judaism was tolerated by Roman statesmanship precisely because it was a national religion and had renounced all attempt to become anything more. That toleration was enjoyed by Christianity so long as the Christians were supposed to be some obscure and

unintelligible sect of the Jews. When they emerged from that position, they became an object at once of hatred to the Jews and of suspicion to the imperial authorities: the Christians were persecuted by both. The Jews were hated by other peoples then—and the feeling is not extinct even now in Europe or America—and the Christians, regarded at first as a sect of the Jews, were regarded by the populace with the same antipathy. On the part of the authorities, the persecution of the Christians was inspired by no feeling of religious intolerance: sheer obstinacy alone could be invoked to account for the Christians' refusal to do what every other sect did—why could they not worship their supreme god under the name of Zeus, recognize their angels under the names of the other subordinate deities, and render formal respect to the genius of the Emperor? That the formal, official religion of the State, the established religion, could be attacked on religious grounds, was an idea which could not present itself to statesmen who, at least from the time of Augustus, in their personal indifference to religion, had seen in religion no potentiality but that of being one of the instruments which lay ready to the hand of the statesman to be used for political purposes. The danger of that mistake indeed lurks wherever an established religion exists. But if the statesmen of imperial Rome were at first unconscious of the fact that it was with a religious force they had now to deal, the Christians were not. The struggle evoked the self-consciousness of Christianity. The demand to render to the genius of the Caesar the worship which was God's was one to which the answer had been provided by Jesus. And the answer from the Church went up in a tumultuous explosion of fanaticism which to this day flames with extraordinary—and to the ordinary reader incomprehensible—brightness in the Apocalypse. Rome, drunk with the blood of the saints and of the martyrs, shall be consumed, and her smoke go up forever and ever. Never again did Christian fanaticism flame so fiercely against the Empire as it does in the Revelation of S. John the Divine; but, as Doctor Wendland says, it is not insignificant that that apocalypse was received into the canonical scriptures.

But if fanaticism, inflamed by persecution, shot forth in one direction with a fury which finds no justification in the spirit

of the marvellous words, "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's," on the other hand, first Paul (Romans 13) and after him the Church, made more politic use of the permission to render to the Caesar the things that were his. The friendly attitude to the authority of the State which manifests itself in Luke and in the Fourth Gospel is borne out by the prayers for the Emperor which were used early by the Christian communities and by the loyalty which was preached even in spite of persecution. But on this side, too, it was possible to misinterpret the words, and to abandon their spirit. The spirit of the words is the indifference to be felt by the Church Universal toward forms of political government: to none can it be limited, still less can it be identified with any. This fundamental truth was obscured from view by the issue of the struggle as to whether the Roman Empire should dominate Christianity, or Christianity the Empire. Christianity became, in the issue, the established religion of the Empire and an instrument of the political ambition of the Papacy. Its consciousness of its mission to become the universal religion was overpowered by desire for universal political power. So it did indeed gain the political strength which enabled it, when the time came, to fight Mohammedanism with Mohammedanism's own weapon, the sword. *Sed non tali auxilio*—it is not by such a weapon that a religion can win its way. The sword has broken in the hands of Mohammedanism: Islam has now no political unity. Its only hope thereof is a Holy War—a hope not yet banished to the limbo of political impossibilities. The political weapon broke in Christianity's hands also: the Reformation shattered it, though the Church of Rome still feebly stretches its hands after it—in vain. No national, no established church, no church which is the tool of political ambition, will or can be the Church Universal. It is from America that the majority of missionaries proceed; though let us not forget that Rome too works, and always has worked, unceasingly in the mission field. In that field at any rate the differences which divide Christendom diminish in importance; there the consciousness of our common Christianity is taken for what it is—the supreme fact. If it is now as impossible for all within the Church Universal to recognize the infallibility of the

Pope as it was for all within the Roman Empire to render worship to the genius of the Roman Emperor, the ultimate issue in the one case as in the other will justify the protest and the protestants.

Indifference to forms of political government is in effect the principle on which the evolution of a world-religion depends. But the lesson was, and is, one hard to learn. To postpone the realization of a Church Universal until a world-empire has established itself is to proclaim that the Church must, to realize its own proper end, subserve the ambitions and back the policy of some one political power—must render to Caesar, Kaiser, Czar, or Emperor the things that are God's. Christianity can live, and has lived and flourished, under any form of government. It even survives when it relapses into the form of a state-religion, or established church. But, in such a case, it also throws out fresh roots in the form of free churches. But Christianity is not to be confined within any bonds, not to be limited even to the free churches. It is the religion by which Jesus brings us all to Our Father. The religious consciousness is a common consciousness of objective facts, the reality of which is given in the individual consciousness, but given in that very act as of universal, and not merely subjective, validity and truth.

[The work of Professor Paul Wendland to which Professor Jevons refers (p. 171) is part of a Handbook to the New Testament which is being published by the firm of J. C. B. Mohr, in Tübingen, under the editorial supervision of Hans Lietzmann. In it the author, who possesses exceptional qualifications for the task, has described in comparatively small compass the civilization of the Greek and Roman world at the beginning of the Christian era, especially as it influenced the spread or development of Judaism and Christianity.

In a series of interesting chapters he discusses the changes which the establishment of a universal empire wrought in religious as well as in political conditions; the development, in theory and fact, of cosmopolitanism and individualism; the prevailing conceptions and ideals of culture; the missionary activity of philosophical schools, and the popular discourse (*diatribe*) as a

means of propagating their influence; religious development in the Hellenistic world and under Roman rule; the influence of contemporary culture on the Jews in Palestine and in Greek-speaking countries; the relations of early Christianity to Hellenism, especially on its religious side—attraction and repulsion; finally, on syncretism and gnosticism.

The extent to which the missionaries of moral philosophy prepared the way for the missionaries of Christian faith has not been generally recognized. The paragraphs on Paul are fresh and full of insight. The volume forms an admirable introduction to the study of the New Testament and of early Christian history. Its value is enhanced by the judicious treatment of the abundant and somewhat scattered literature on the subjects with which the volume deals.—Ed.]

SOME RECENT WORKS ON SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

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Systematic theology in its classic form is at once a philosophy of religion, a philosophy of history, and a world-view. It sums up in its master mind, St. Thomas Aquinas, the knowledge of its age. A great picture it is—none greater was ever conceived; indeed, for completeness, for dramatic movement, and for religious interest, none has ever remotely rivalled it. The great epics of Hinduism and the world-views of Buddhism and Islam fall far short in power and unity, in scientific grasp and form, in philosophic insight and in moral purpose; while the modern world has nothing which can be put in comparison, for our world-view is incomplete, discordant, perplexed with doubts, nor has it come to an understanding with the religious and ethical nature of man.

What forces went into the formation of the masterpiece, scholars well know; but we cannot so much as name them here, nor shall we attempt to discriminate and to determine how far it represented primitive Christianity. It was the growth of a thousand years, and, completed, it had centuries for its own; science and philosophy, literature and music and art, were its hand-maidens, and it ruled them rigidly. Not even the Protestant Reformation could disturb its sway, for only details were in issue, and the world-view remained undisturbed; indeed, its dominion was extended as common men were thenceforth instructed in its outlines.

Francis L. Patton, *A Summary of Christian Doctrine*, 1906 (copyright, 1875).

Augustus Hopkins Strong, *Systematic Theology*, seventh edition, 1902; eighth, 1907.

William Newton Clarke, *An Outline of Christian Theology*, 1898.

Clarence Augustine Beckwith, *Realities of Christian Theology*, 1906.

William Adams Brown, *Christian Theology in Outline*, 1906.

George Burman Foster, *The Finality of the Christian Religion*, 1906.

Dante once for all gave it immortal form, Milton carried it wherever the English tongue was spoken, and Bunyan made its rudiments as household words. Thus it entered into the minds of the people, fitting well enough the naïve cosmology derived from the senses and their interpretation of the Bible, since its science is the simple knowledge of the common man.

But the completeness and absoluteness of the system proved its undoing. How great the revolution between the thirteenth century and our own, between the seventeenth century and our own! Moreover, so much was unnecessary, since already in the sixteenth century men were quick to see that Galileo's doctrine undermined the system. What of its history, of its cosmology, even of its dramatization of the incarnation—he descended from above; he ascended into heaven; he sitteth at the right hand of God, from whence he shall come to judge the quick and the dead? We shall not dwell upon the story, but Melanchthon and Bellarmine were right, the assertion of the truth of the Copernican hypothesis was the denial of theology.

How far we have come in these last four hundred years! What item of the knowledge of the thirteenth century now remains in philosophy, logic, history, natural science? Moreover, the new knowledge is widely extended in its influence, displacing the old even with uneducated folk. No Bunyan indeed has arisen to popularize it, but it is the commonplace of our schools and magazines and newspapers, and is embodied in the appliances which contribute to our modern civilization. The old learning is not disproved but forgotten. Theology alone of the mediaeval sciences remains still in its mediaeval form, with the same style of argumentation, the same framework and categories, the same material in largest part, and the identical illustrations. Only in points here and there has it been retouched, for theology has been identified with the truth—the truth about God necessary to men's salvation—and religion has been identified with creed, and thus a sacred conservatism has protected the system, and men given to its study have deemed it the holy place of the Most High. We are slow to think our concepts together, and nowhere so slow as here, while to keep differing forms of thinking separate, to be of the thirteenth and the twentieth century simultaneously or alter-

nately, is part of the fortunate inconsistency of mind which makes at once transition and continuity possible, which makes a progressive society possible.

A review of recent books of theology suggests this line of thought. Our list is taken only from representatives of the evangelical churches in the United States, and has none upon it whose author is not in regular standing in his communion; yet how various the attitudes, and how widely different the degrees of consciousness of the conflict of world-views! The study is interesting as an investigation into the manners and ways of the theological mind.

Modern text-books of Roman Catholic theology avow at once their adherence to the theology of St. Thomas Aquinas, as indeed they must since the encyclical of Leo XIII, "Aeterni Patris," August 4, 1879. In the same spirit certain Protestant theologians with equal confidence maintain the scheme of the seventeenth century scholasticism; and it is to be noted that the world-view of the seventeenth century scholastics differed not at all from that of the "Angelical Doctor." One might compare profitably the *Manual of Catholic Theology* by George Wilhelm and Thomas B. Scannell (1906) with the work of Dr. Strong to see how closely the two resemble each other. They are of the same school, and the advantage on disputed points is in doubt.

In our first group are men who permit the modern view to exercise no influence upon their theology, and for substance of doctrine the papal encyclical against Modernism would trouble them not at all. President Patton in a brief manual sums up his conclusions; a very few quotations will show his point of view. Theology is for him still queen of the sciences, and its acceptance the most important of intellectual acts, and this because of its utility. "The most important truth to every man is that which makes known the conditions of a happy hereafter. 'The doctrines' claim a position above all other truth because of their practical value" (p. 5); and this view is set forth in the ancient forms: "Entering heaven, the weary find rest, the wanderer a home, and the pilgrim leaves his tent for a city that hath foundations. Earth's sinning Christians shall wear white robes. Earth's sorrowing disciples shall waken notes of joy from harps of gold" (p. 116). Crit-

ical views as to the historicity of the Biblical narratives and as to the composition of the text are simply denied: "The historic credibility of the Bible is a settled question. The books of Moses were written by Moses. The Gospels are genuine biographies, and were written by the men whose names they bear. What is true of the Pentateuch and of the Gospels is true of all the other books of the Bible" (p. 25). "All the parts of the Old Testament are put on the same level. No difference of rank or value is recognized" (p. 27), and, in short, all "the Bible is infallible" (p. 26). We are descended from Adam and inherit his guilt (p. 36). And our relationship to God is primarily that of the criminal to the judge, for the saving act is not moral, nor is it pardon, but it is directly forensic. Christ has paid our penalty so that we owe nothing and are free (p. 59 ff.). God is understood and his existence proved in the ancient way, and Paley's watch still does service in the teleological argument. The incomprehensibility of God is above reason but not against it, while still we can judge of him neither by our standards of reason nor by our standards of morality, as the laws which govern us do not apply to him (p. 19). Modern science does not exist; acceptance of evolution is referred to contemptuously, and it is categorically affirmed that "there is no evidence that any species has developed by gradual transition out of a lower species" (p. 12). It is in accordance with this type of doctrine that the chief authority for President Patton is Professor Charles Hodge, and that the edition of 1906 still bears the copyright date, 1875.

The same attitude is maintained in a far more elaborate work by President Strong, of the Rochester Theological Seminary. He differs, it is true, on various points like "imputation" from the Princeton view, but the argumentation is of the same character and the two are in the same class. They represent together the instruction given in a majority of American theological seminaries. Our author's *Systematic Theology* appeared in its seventh edition in 1902, and the first volume of the greatly expanded eighth edition bears the date 1907. In the five years Dr. Strong's opinions have been modified at a few points, but the system is scarcely touched. In the seventh edition he accepted the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch (p. 82), while he now adopts Wood's theory of

"stratification" (p. 171), but this does not affect the substance of doctrine. "The Bible is the work of one mind." "Not one moral or religious utterance of all these writers has been contradicted or superseded by the utterances of those who have come after, but all together constitute a consistent system" (p. 175). "There are degrees of value but not of inspiration" (p. 220). "We do not admit the existence of scientific error in Scripture" (p. 223). "It may be safely said that science has not yet shown any fairly interpreted passage of Scripture to be untrue" (p. 224). And the same may be said of its history (pp. 226-228); while it is denied that such errors, if they existed, would injure its value as a revelation (p. 228).

These statements carry with them acceptance of the great age of the antediluvians and the flood (p. 229), and stories like those of Samson and Balaam (p. 196). Science and the Bible are "reconciled" in the usual fashion (pp. 223 ff.). We cannot forbear to quote some illustrations from the seventh edition, the corresponding section of the eighth edition not having as yet come into our hands: The Mosaic narrative of creation is "a pictorial-summary interpretation," "a rough sketch of the history of creation, true in all its essential features." It is so given that "it could expand to all the ascertained results of subsequent physical research" (p. 193). So with Genesis 3 1-7: "Its general character [is] not mythical or allegorical, but historical" (p. 302). If we ask how it is then that death was in the world, as geology shows, before the fall, the answer is at hand: "God arranged even the geological history to correspond with the foreseen effect of human apostasy" (p. 353). One admires such powers of argumentation almost more than he does the miracle of an inspiration which so elastically sketches essential features that they can stretch to embrace all possible discoveries. In argument and revelation the human and the divine are in a rare combination, defying all hostile science, a combination which is invincible, and needs only to be supplemented by the author's position that miracle and prophecy constitute an important proof of revelation since some such outward sign seems necessary to secure the recipient against self-deception and to make the revelation authoritative to all (p. 116, last edition).

We respect and admire Aquinas, and we can even understand the attempt of the Roman Church to impose his teaching on the present age. In a fashion one admires the audacity it shows, while recognizing its utter futility. By his authority the Pope may, it is true, silence Modernism in the church; but he cannot extirpate it, nor influence in the smallest degree the great world-movement which it represents. So one may admire the Westminster Assembly of divines, without joining in the notion that their views are sufficient for today. Our Protestant scholastics of the twentieth century are engaged in the same attempt as is the Pope, but without his authority. They stand much nearer to Rome than to distinguished theologians of their own denominations. For example, how can we measure the distance which separates Rochester from Colgate if we are to judge by their theological output, yet both are of the Baptist denomination. The professor of theology in the latter, however, seeks to understand his own time, and he writes for living men.

For Professor Clarke there is no longer any absolute system of theology, for all our truth is relative. "The theology of any age is largely an expression of the Christian experience of that age." "Theology is formed in it as in an atmosphere. The theologies of today are part and product of the Christian life of today. . . . This is why they differ from previous theologies" (p. 19). Thus there is no hard and fast faith once delivered to the saints, nor any revelation which may be—must be—tortured and stretched to meet all contingencies. "Christian Theology is the intellectual treatment of the Christian religion" (p. 6). It is therefore subject to all the limits of intellectual endeavor, and it is also enriched by all the fruits of intellectual achievement. "In order to success in theology, a man should be sensitive to life and able to think in sympathy with the living thought of his time" (p. 57). No scientific knowledge is foreign to him, for he has reverence for all truth. These judgments condemn not only the authors of our first division but most of the voluminous theologies of the past fifty years. It follows naturally that the questions of the origin of the world and of men are not to be settled by learned exegesis of the earlier chapters of Genesis, but by the appropriate sciences (pp. 222-223). For religion is not dependent upon these terms

of origin, while it is apparent that science gives "an evolutionary answer" (p. 224). Coming so far, Doctor Clarke faces fearlessly the critical problems of the Bible, and all questions of date and authorship are left unhesitatingly to the results of scholarly investigation.

That these principles are not carried out in a thorough-going fashion is not to the discredit of Professor Clarke. In the discussion of sin, the third chapter of Genesis still remains, not as history indeed, but "as a strikingly true picture of the real nature of sin and the principle on which it entered to mankind" (p. 241), while the reader may be referred to the discussion of the Trinity (pp. 161-181) and of Christ (pp. 260 ff.) as indicating how far the older categories retain their mastery. Yet even here, how widely different is the spirit, and how constant the effort to realize the truth in the experience and to make the ethical and religious supreme; and what a difference between the robes and harps of President Patton and Professor Clarke's thought of salvation, which is "to be transformed into the likeness of God in Christ"!

Probably no one else has so influenced the evangelical theology of the twentieth century as has Professor Clarke; his spirituality, his ethical soundness, his moderation and self-restraint, his avoidance of current terms applied with little appreciation of their meaning, and his holding fast to the old until assured of the new, have all combined to give him wide influence. For Professor Clarke science is manifestly no longer the hand-maid of theology to be scolded and commanded, but it too is a revelation of God. Reason has come to its full rights. Once the Christian religion entered the domain of reason, the Greek philosophy, as an alien, submitting to its laws and adopting its methods. Naturalized, it modified its adopted home: grown strong at last, it seized the reins of power and ruled; but only to cause constant revolts, as reason could not remain enslaved, and asserted itself, at first in the outer courts, but at last in the centre of imperial power. Natural science, logic, philosophy, and now religion, acknowledge reason as supreme. For Professor Clarke the day of dogmatic authority is ended. It is inevitable that others shall attempt to go farther on the same road.

We turn to the Congregational denomination for our illustration, and find it in *The Realities of Christian Theology*. With Professor Clarke the rights of historical criticism and of science are admitted, but Professor Beckwith is to give us "a fresh interpretation of Christian experience in terms of modern intelligence" (p. vii). In this endeavor two factors are of prime importance, psychology and evolution. "The value of psychology in our discussion is many-sided. In tracing the development of religious beliefs, for instance, it is to be remembered that these have all had a psychological history. They have taken their rise in consciousness and followed a genetic order." "No study is more fascinating, as, indeed, none is more rewarding, than to trace the psychological history of the belief in God, the conception of sacrifice, the notion of sin, and the doctrine of a future life" (p. 5). "The new psychological study of conversion is doing more to reveal its true nature than all other inquiries combined" (p. 9). "The number of adolescent conversions discloses a uniformity of experience which can be accounted for only on the basis of a law of consciousness" (p. 10). But psychology has also its transforming influence on particular doctrines. "All the questions which come up with reference to the development of the kingdom of God on earth, of a so-called probation after death, of a Second Coming, and subjects associated with these in theological discussion, of punishment and blessedness, have been profoundly modified in the precise degree to which the essential laws of the human consciousness have become fully known" (p. 11). Evolution, too, "is to be frankly and heartily accepted as furnishing an interpretative principle to all those events with which theology is concerned." "First, in respect to the world itself." "Secondly, Christianity, both in its origin and in its development, is subject to the same law" (pp. 11-12). We do Professor Beckwith injustice in these quotations, as one should read his entire introduction to see how completely he adopts the modern point of view.

But when we turn to his discussion we are perplexed, for "The traditional order of topics is mainly followed, partly for convenience, and partly because to one who travels through a country it is of less importance by what route he goes than what he sees

on the way" (p. ix). But the route determines the country one travels through and fixes in advance the objects he shall see. The ancient dogmatic order is not of secondary consequence, but belongs to the system; and it leads straight to the heart of the thirteenth century. So after all, in the *Realities of Christian Theology* we have the old questions discussed once more, and in much the old way. It is true that in the doctrine of God we have an interpretation of the origin of the concept of God from a study of comparative religion—a wrong derivation in my judgment, but that does not matter—and then precisely the same list of attributes and the same distinctions as to being, distinctions carried out into full scholasticism in the final chapter on the Trinity. In the discussion of man, also, Genesis reappears; and when one turns to the "last things," it is emphatically not psychology which is predominant. The attempt indeed is foredoomed to failure, for if one is to have a theology with psychology and evolution as guiding principles, it is clear that not only the old order and the old terminology but the old problems are doomed. They arose in different circumstances, they are the product of a different world-view, and they look askew when seen from the standing-ground of modern men.

But are we prepared for such a reconstruction? Philosophical schools are in chaos, and we have only the beginnings of the psychology of religion. Ladd, Höffding, Leuba, and James have given us careful studies; but neither do they agree among themselves, nor would any of them attempt to reconstruct the doctrine of the resurrection or of the second coming of our Lord by the aid of this discipline. Ladd and Höffding show us what religion really is to men who understand psychology; and they by no means find the traditional order of topics convenient, nor do they pass through the same territory or see the same things.

The same thing may be said of evolution, for one does not see its value as a determining principle in a theology which stands by the old categories. They are framed on the principle of *being*, while it adopts the notion of *becoming*. Really to adopt this principle with its consequences, making all knowledge strictly relative, would affect, not the angle at which the old doctrines are

seen, but the foundation principles on which they rest; for the principle of Heraclitus destroys a scholasticism built upon a union of Neoplatonism and thirteenth century Aristotelianism. And, once more, is evolution in a condition to give us a theology? One cannot find so much as an authoritative definition of the word, and Professor Beckwith never tells us what he means by it. In the clash of modern scientific schools one knows no certain ground for the construction of a world-view. In our judgment the application of biological terms to regions where they do not apply, especially to the range of studies roughly grouped under the titles anthropology and sociology, has wrought only injury, and, in particular, the comparative study of religion has suffered. Man's biological development was complete before his religious development began, and a new mythology and a new scholasticism are created when the facts of religious history are forced into an alien framework. But, to do him justice, Professor Beckwith is not open to this charge. His use of these categories is not scientific but rhetorical, and his idea of evolution reminds one not of Darwin or of De Vries, but of a faint shadow of Hegel.

The third book we have chosen to illustrate the effort to bridge the chasm between ancient topics and modern thought is *Christian Theology in Outline*. Its author brings adequate learning to his task, and a clear epistemology which controls his thinking. In this volume is no loose use of terms, but careful definitions formed with equal attention to the past and the present. Every sentence has been studied, and the temptation to a rhetorical use of borrowed terms has not assailed the author.

Professor Brown at the outset discriminates and sets forth his purpose:

I am well aware that there are not a few thoughtful people in our day who, for causes into which it is not necessary here to enter, have moved so far in their sympathies from the historic forms of Christianity that any attempt to relate the living content of our present spiritual life to these forms seems to them misleading, if not disingenuous. I believe that one of the most important problems which face the Christian theologian at the present day is how to present the permanent elements in the Christian message in a form to appeal to those who have thus broken with the past. But, legitimate and fascinating as this attempt may be,

it is not the task proposed in the present book. The public which it addresses consists of those who still feel themselves at home in the Christian church, who value the heritage which has come down to them from the past as a priceless possession, but who do not always see clearly how to relate this treasure to the world of thought in which they are living, and so find themselves in a situation of perplexity, if not of positive distress. To such the reinterpretation of old terms here proposed may serve as a help and not a hindrance, fostering that sense of spiritual unity with the past without which the religious life of the present must necessarily be impoverished.¹

The position has indeed its difficulties, and they are scarcely made less by their recognition; none of our other authors thus far has seen them so clearly. The question for the theologian before all other questions is that of truth, and our first problem is this: Can the "historic forms of Christianity" be rendered into the modern world-view? If not, efforts in this direction seem to partake of *ho-ben*, an expressive Buddhist phrase which means the adoption of forms cast aside by the teacher for himself but used for others for paedagogic purposes. It is perhaps not surprising that our author has been charged by one sharp critic with being disingenuous, while other critics have held that his use of these forms is misleading since he is governed by a thorough-going rationalism. But the charges from the left and right are untrue, as indeed they are untrue for all our mediating theologians. Professor Brown proves by his book that he is sincerely devoted to the terms and forms of historic Christianity; for him they have far more than a paedagogic value, as they represent fundamental and enduring truth. With enthusiasm he receives his precious theological inheritance, and it is not merely for convenience' sake that he adopts the ancient itinerary and travels through the familiar scenes. These are his not only by birthright but by mature reflection and conscious adoption.

Yet the older presuppositions have disappeared; for example, he no longer holds the metaphysics of being, for activity is the category of reality for him, so that a person or a thing is known by its doings. If one would appreciate how far-reaching is this principle, let him read the chapter on the Trinity and compare

¹ Pages viii-ix.

it with the corresponding passages in Clarke and Beckwith. For Brown the triunity is not in the being of God but in the receptivity of our minds, and its truth therefore is found in his manifestation to us; for our knowledge of God, while not of some abstract being, is all the more real on this account. For as the sun has warmth and light as thus we respond to its power, so is God love and righteousness as his presence awakens response in us. Moreover, as we know the sun only through our response, so only do we know God. "The self-revealing God is the real God,—the only God we can or need to know" (p. 161). Here is no misleading use of psychology or of evolution; but the transformation is more thorough-going, since epistemology applies directly to all problems of theology—indeed, for the consistent thinker, as is his epistemology so shall his philosophy and theology be.

Nevertheless, the philosophical interest of the old system reasserts itself: a philosophical trinity is essential, and the doctrine remains as "the most concise and the most comprehensive statement of the Christian faith, gathering into a single phrase all the richness of content which has entered into the thought of God through the Christian experience of redemption" (p. 163). When we ask why this is so, we are told that our reason demands a unified world-view, and that this is met by the philosophical trinity (pp. 159–163). One may question, to begin with, whether any philosophical trinity gives us a unified world-view, however readily we may agree that it gives to us a comprehensive statement of Christian experience. Granted that the intellect demands a unified world-view, ancient dualists and modern pluralists to the contrary notwithstanding, still does it follow that theology must present it, and specifically does the Christian religion present it? And once more, does our modern science make it possible, or is the doctrine of the Trinity adequate to this demand? Modern science may admit monism as a demand of the intellect and accept it as a practical postulate of faith; but the demand can be met only tentatively and hypothetically, and in no sense in some single phrase which shall be accepted as fundamental. For Professor Brown the ancient form clouds the discussion, and leads here and there to unexpected statements; for him in reality, we

take it, this unified world-view is like the possibility of a complete knowledge, it is a *terminus ad quem*.

The same may be said of his discussion of the absolute; the reader must keep Professor Brown's epistemology in mind and all his wits about him or he will be misled. Here again the substance agrees with the epistemology, but the form makes the order wrong, and this tends to leave a false impression on all but the most discerning readers. And once more, in the discussion of God the fitting of the new material into the old forms makes too great demands on the reader, for though the definition of an attribute leaves nothing to be desired if we catch the author's thought, the order of the following discussion takes us to the verge of unreality.

However, it is apparent that the volume meets a genuine need and serves a high purpose; it is a large and increasing class of ministers and laymen who occupy precisely the position Professor Brown has in view. They have not broken with the historic forms of Christianity, and they do breathe the atmosphere of our age. Books like those in our first class present to them a dismal alternative—either they must give up Christianity or they must surrender scientific truth. The encyclical of the Pope puts Catholics into this dilemma, a dilemma the more terrible in proportion to the strength of the love for our religion. Our Protestant scholastics lack the thunders of the papal power, but so far as in them lies they force their readers to the same fatal choice. To all perplexed by the dualistic severance of theology from truth, come the mediating theologians with discernment, learning, religious fervor, and profound truth, showing the way themselves have found to peace. Professors Clarke, Beckwith, and Brown in their several degrees perform this service for the church.

With Professor Brown however the method is at the breaking point; a little larger application and it is shattered. We doubt if more of the new wine could be poured into the old bottles and still both be preserved. It remains for some one to cast the forms themselves wholly aside.

This Professor Foster essays to do in *The Finality of the Christian Religion*. He is to discuss the real problems, and we do not expect him to adopt the old order of topics as a convenience nor

to travel by the old route. Indeed, for him the past has been destroyed like the island of the Malay Archipelago which the explosion on Krakatoa overwhelmed, and for our author no faint sound of church-bells beneath the sea causes even a passing pang of regret.

The book in its greater part is an account of the explosion; from point after point it shows the destructive energy of the seismic force, summing all up in the fifth chapter, *The Changed View of the World and of Life*. But our author is not content with this, but goes on to bring the resources of modern scholarship to bear without reservation upon the gospel narrative itself, and raises the main question, whether there be any permanent in Christianity (p. 10). His argument is not dogmatic but apologetic. Science is knowledge of truth; it is not simply a hypothesis, though hypotheses enter into it; it is not a body of opinion out of which certain opinions may be taken and others left; but it is what we know, and this knowledge differs *toto caelo* from the knowledge of the thirteenth century. For Professor Foster there is no light-hearted acceptance of psychology and evolution as giving our old dogmas in new lights, but a resolute grasp of the facts and an equally resolute rejection of all which is opposed to them.

This is the general impression made by the book and by the earnestness, fearlessness, and industry of its author. For him no difficulty is too small and no discussion too intricate, so that our second impression is that the work is fine-spun and prolix. For example see in Chapter 7 the discussion of the method of historical study: Is it idiographic, or nomothetic, or teleological, or, as the author thinks, a combination of the first two (pp. 303-324)? One may ask indeed for whom was the book written; not, surely, for those whom Professor Brown has in view, for they would be bewildered, offended, and left in suspense; but also surely not for men who have broken with the old forms, since for them the destructive part is a slaying of the dead and the construction is all too slight. It is not for the modern man who doubts the Christian religion, since for him as apologetic it does not enter into the main question at all. It reads like a record of the progress of the author's own convictions, and its value is chiefly for

men passing through the same phases of intellectual experience. How else shall we account for the long chapter on the sources of the life of Christ; for should an author assume that he must say it all, and that his readers have only his book open to them?

Perhaps, after all, the older types still exert their influence, not now as formative, but negatively as worthy of combat. This would account for the fierceness of his onslaught; but positively also they remain as ghosts, forcing him to long engagements with history and with naturalism, until one asks whether the finality of the Christian religion can indeed depend upon these minute discussions and this intricate argumentation. For Christianity was the faith of plain people before it became the prey of scholars; it was a saving power before it became a world-view. The real issue is this, Does Christianity still save? Modern science would be as unconvincing to the world as is theology if it consisted only of its discussions as to atoms and ether and method; but science embodies itself in facts, and forces itself upon our attention as it lights our houses, drives our cars, and revolutionizes our civilization. Real knowledge starts with facts, and to facts it returns, and by facts it is judged.

Professor Foster, it is true, gives us here and there the truth by which he lives, "The veracious self-dependence of love as the kernel and star of the religious life—this is the innermost meaning and message of the Master" (p. 472). Love "has the sublime composure of creative power; it has divine genius and authority. It is this love, *and this alone*, that Jesus says is required of men" (p. 472). Christianity, he tells us, is "the spirit of Christ" (p. 134). "Faith in the divine truth of Christianity is not founded on the bodily resurrection of Jesus, . . . but on its new content, the world of love and grace" (p. 137). So we believe in God, "not on the basis of any external authority whatsoever, but on the basis of our own moral experience" (p. 135); and in Jesus as "reconciler," because "his Spirit dwells in us and fills us with the peace of God" (p. 136).

In general we may say the point of view is Kant's, but filled out and given motive power by the spirit of Jesus. "We are saved, not by ideas, but by ideals. Thus, too, the revelation which Jesus brought is himself; and Kant was right when he said that

there was nothing good in the world save a good will alone" (p. 187). Christianity is "not a religion of facts, but of values; and values are timeless; that is, Christianity is an eternal religion which is *in*, but not *of*, the historical" (p. xiii).

The treatment is incomplete; a second volume is promised in which the constructive will be more evident, and until it appears it is unfair to criticize the present work as more than preparatory, but as such it is representative of much of the work of modern men. They are endlessly patient in details and fearlessly honest; they follow truth wherever it leads them, even though it be to an increasingly thorough destruction, but they are not equally clear in their statements of positive truth, for as yet, we take it, they are not certain as to that saving faith by which men live and for which they would die. Nor, we may add in conclusion, does Professor Foster show upon what terms men who have never held the ancient forms may come to the central message; and this question deserves an answer—whether without the very doctrines he rejects the modern world would have found the truth he holds.

Our survey of these notable books raises once more the question of the possibility of a systematic theology. The old we know. Its great authors had no question as to the truth of its world-view and of its entire accord with Christian facts; but its acceptance in our day is impossible, unless we admit a fundamental dualism of truth, agreeing that what is false in science is true in theology. That cannot be; and as the opposition becomes apparent, men will choose, and not for theology. The crisis is in Protestantism as in Romanism, and its end is easily foreseen.

Then shall we retranslate our terms into modern speech? The attempt is laudable and necessary, it would be unfair to the present as to the past if it were not made. Let the old order and the old forms and the old beliefs be arrayed in the costume of the present. In all seriousness let me repeat how deeply I sympathize with the attempt and how sincerely I could wish it entire success; but to men who have broken with the old forms it looks like a masquerade, ingenious, interesting, but unconvincing, unreal, and ready to disappear at dawn.

On the other hand, we have the philosophy of religion, and we

are told that it will suffice. Its advantages are great; it is of the modern age, whose methods are its own by birthright; it is freed from the trammels of the ancient order of topics and of the ancient material. It need not profess omniscience, but can openly avow that it does not know; but for all it does not give us religion, as it does not profess so to do, and at least it leaves room for the thorough-going treatment of our faith. Religion is a permanent fact, and its greatest expression is Christianity. Religion is in the feelings, veneration, adoration, worship, dependence, trust, and these are called forth by objects we agree to name divine. Religion may be formal, it may be superficial, it may be degrading and degraded, but at its best it is the deepest response of the self to the highest we know. Religion is essentially subjective, and in the self it finds its reality. In all religions a vital experience has been sought for; unfound, religion is only a rite, a creed, a pretence. What then shall call forth the deepest trust and the holiest adoration? Answer, and you describe your God. It is apparent that one has qualifications for theology only as he has the experience. The essence of Christianity will never be discovered by learned discussions, but only by a living faith. What is it that is God to me, to you? This is what we meant by Christianity being a fact, a fact of saving power, a fact for scholar and for boor, a fact of blood-red earnestness, a fact whose everlasting symbol is the Cross. It is this first of all, or it is only an elaborate subject for learned discussion, signifying nothing. What is the significance of this experience, how is it related to Jesus, and finally is it true, not simply as bare fact—this we know—but true as related to the totality of our experience? Was Jesus' trust of the Father justified? Is our trust in the eternal goodness justified? Was Jesus right in his choice of a life-purpose and of the means he adopted to this end, and are we justified in seeking to be of his mind?

Theology can never divorce itself from the quest for truth; it can never permit *ho-ben*, nor can it content itself, like mysticism, with mere experience. Its task is not the ancient one; it no longer takes all knowledge as its field nor has it a list of propositions as unchanging norm. It deals with few topics, but they

the highest. Its task is never finished. In religion man in his deepest experience surrenders himself to the highest he can know. To divine this highest is a limitless task for a widening experience, and glimpses of new truth stir afresh the soul. Old things pass away; all things become new. Only when we know as we are known can we have a theology which shall need no revision; and only when we see face to face, when we enter into full communion with the Father, can we describe the finality of our religion. All else is subordinate, mechanism, metaphysics, history, since to one task and to it alone theology should devote itself. And we still wait for the genius who shall state our fundamental faith in accordance with that insight which the modern man has gained.

ETHICAL MONISM AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

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A favourite argument of the neo-Hegelian apologists for the appearance of evil in a perfect world is the contention that without evil good could not exist. By this we are to understand, not that evil is a *sine qua non* of the existence of the good, unavoidably incidental to its production and maintenance, but rather, indeed, that it is an indispensable factor in the very essence of perfection and positively contributive to its value. Unaltered in accidents yet changed in substance, it is, as it were, transubstantiated by an eternal act of consecration in the mind and purpose of God. That we neither perceive nor comprehend the miracle is due to our human limitations. Could we see things as God sees them, "under the aspect of eternity," we should then understand how what we call sin and suffering and defeat and shame have their place in the economy of the whole, and provide, along with the other oppositions and conflicts in the world, the indispensable condition of that victorious battle with obstacles and limitations and that triumphant resolution of contradictories in higher syntheses in which the life and happiness of the absolute consists. So, though our partial and superficial experiences do not enjoy the triumph (and indeed cannot, since were we conquerors or indifferent to defeat there would be no evil to transcend), we may yet have faith that in our deepest and total self the victory has been won and peace attained. Thus God's ways are justified to man; and though the world is apparently full of evil, we are still entitled to believe it really good, and are able intelligently to account for and defend our belief.

If we divest this theory of its rhetoric, its weight stripped is that the imperfection of the part is consonant with the perfection of the whole. This is the real thesis which underlies the various fashions of the argument. Its distinctions between the partial

and the complete points of view, its invocations of analogies drawn from aesthetic experience, its appeals to the verities of the moral life, all do but seek in different ways to make credible and inspiring this cold and homely proposition.

The design of the present article is to sketch in bare outline an *exposé* of this attempt. Such a sketch must necessarily be disjointed, for it has not only to show up the thesis itself, questioning the validity of the proposition *a priori*, but also to follow it in its appeal to concrete experience, pointing out the confusions of which it is guilty and the inappropriateness of the analogies upon which it relies. Of necessity, then, we shall be forced to string the points which we wish to make somewhat loosely upon the thread of argument.

Let us join issue then at once. Our first step may well be to clear the ground and expose the main position by making once and for all the distinction between moral and natural perfection. It is all the more important to do so, inasmuch as the crucial difficulty with the absolutist's position seems to lie in his inability not to confuse them.

It must be obvious that the moral imperfection of any or of all the parts in no wise contradicts the natural perfection of the whole. Natural perfection is synonymous with explained systematic existence; and the explicability of things has nothing to do with their moral values, in the narrower sense of the term. We are as able to find sufficient reason in the constitution of mechanical nature for what we call evil as for what we call good. The causes of sin and suffering as well as of virtue and happiness can be traced, and both will be found equally congruous with its systematic character, equally intelligible, and hence, metaphorically speaking, equally good from its point of view. It is one of the axioms of the scientific method and interest that whatever is, is right.

So far then as the absolutist is a naturalist and imputes merely a mechanical perfection to reality, we have no quarrel with him. But he is not usually so discreet. He insists upon attributing to reality a perfection in which not merely our passion for truth but our passions for goodness and beauty find, did we but know it, their absolute satisfaction.

This, on the face of it, is a different proposition. The ethical ideal is determined by other purposes beside the scientific. In the world of moral values things are not justified by their existence, nor do they find sufficient reason in their natural causes. The moral interest in them is not satisfied by showing their place and necessity in the natural order. They are good only if room can be found for them in an ideal reconstruction of the natural order determined not only by logical but by aesthetic and moral considerations. I do not mean, be it noted, that this ideally reconstructed world would not be mechanical. On the contrary, there is no *a priori* reason why a perfect life should not flourish in a mechanical order. As it is, such a view of nature seems best to satisfy the logical and scientific interest in understanding the world. And it would answer to the moral demand also, provided only the mechanism were such as not to subvert our other interests, but to furnish us rather, as it did the Epicurean gods, with the means of happy self-realization:

Omnia suppeditat porro Natura, neque ulla
Res animi pacem delibat tempore in ullo.

But, to revert from this digression concerning the mechanical hypothesis, it is certainly difficult to understand, at any rate on the level of abstract reasoning, how any whole can be morally perfect if any of its parts be morally imperfect. For the moral value of the part would seem necessarily to be estimated by its congruity with the total moral order, just as its natural value is determined by its explicability by the natural order in question. Its inexplicable or chance character means its inability to find place and ground in the conceived total system; its imperfect character, its unfitness for inclusion within a perfectly satisfactory whole. To say then that the world may be perfect in spite of the imperfection of its parts, is on a par with saying that it may be completely intelligible notwithstanding an absence of sufficient reason in its constituents. And any demonstration that a morally imperfect fact can belong to a system of facts in its entirety morally satisfactory and perfect will implicitly justify the conclusion that an incomprehensible event can be part of a perfectly comprehensible universe.

At this point, however, the absolutist is likely to take his cue for an impressive entrance. We have given him, he will say, just the opening he was looking for. The part taken by itself may seem chance and unintelligible. It becomes intelligible only when seen in its relations to the total series and system. Taken by itself, also, it may seem imperfect and evil. It becomes good only when seen in its relations to the whole. The origin of evil lies just in the partial and finite point of view.

The correctness of this resolution of evil into partial and fragmentary vision we might sharply challenge, if we chose. It involves a reduction of physical and moral evil to metaphysical evil which is quite unwarranted except in a thorough-going mysticism, and it exemplifies admirably the confusion of moral with natural perfection. But, as the situation is in no wise altered by the contention, it is scarcely worth while to raise the point.

For the absolutist has not solved the problem of evil; he has merely restated it. Grant his contention that evil is a matter of appearance and partiality, and that it is transcended and transmuted to good from the point of view of the whole, the question still remains, how account on his own premises for the existence of the appearance and of the error which it involves? If the world be really perfect, how can it be the basis of any point of view which finds it imperfect? The illusion, at least, of sin and suffering is real enough. The consistent naturalist can perhaps deal with it by saying that the illusion is simply one fact among others. That we make moral distinctions, that we find the world imperfect or irrational, is just one expression, on a par with all other facts, of the nature of things. But if the whole be conceived as possessing a value consonant with our ideal of moral perfection, as responsive, that is, to the demand not only for logical consistency, but for absence of pain and sin as well, the existence of the illusion becomes inexplicable. For the illusion is an evil. Error would be, then, *a priori* impossible in a perfect world. The perfect reality which the absolute is could not account for the imperfection of its appearance in the eyes of what is a part of itself; nor is it comprehensible how the opinion that things are irrational and unsatisfactory should contribute to their real rationality and satisfactoriness. If, to paraphrase Bishop But-

ler, this were a perfect world, it could not be imperfectly comprehended.

The absolutist, however, is ready with his reply. We have not understood him. We have argued on the assumption that good and evil, perfection and imperfection, are contradictory and reciprocally exclusive. But it is this which he denies. It is not contrary to the law of contradiction that evil should be at the same time evil and not evil. A thing may be painful, and yet we may like it; an obstacle, and yet we may enjoy overcoming it. Witness the thrill of pleasure in titillating a sensitive tooth with one's tongue, or the proverbial New England enjoyment of ill-health. And, that his examples may not be wholly pathological, he formulates an elaborate appeal to normal aesthetic and moral experience and to psychology which it now becomes our task to examine and criticize.

We have first to note an invocation of the aesthetic analogy in general. Evil in the world is like the villain in the play, the harsh note or chord in the harmony, or the shadows in the picture. As these, by reason of their very mean, discordant, or dark character, are not only indispensable to bringing out the full value of their opposites but actually enhance the worth of the whole composition, so evil, by virtue of its vicious and evil character, sets off the good and improves the universe.

This is, however, a singularly incorrect and confused translation of ethical into aesthetic terms. Whether or no aesthetic and moral values, regarded in their proper spheres and as expressive of different interests, need coincide, it is plain that if we are to speak analogically of the one in terms of the other the aesthetically good must correspond to the morally good, the aesthetically evil to the morally evil. Only by such a deliberate and exact translation of the one by the other, forced though it may be, is it possible to use the simile at all, and to describe or practise life as a fine art and have it still a moral life.

It is manifestly improper, then, in the example given above to liken moral evil to villain or discord or shadow. For from the point of view of the artist these are in themselves a neutral subject-matter, capable of being made elements in either beauty or in ugliness according as they are well or ill treated. Moral

evil should rather correspond to the unconvincing conception or presentation of the villain, or the inappropriate introduction of the discord, or the wrong painting of the shadow. But in that case the analogy proves a *reductio ad absurdum* of what it is invoked to demonstrate. To say that the world is better for the evil in it, turns out to be like saying that the play is more artistic for being inartistically written, the symphony finer for being ill-composed, the picture greater for being indifferently painted.

But the absolutist will put this aside as a mere sophism: the point is, he will insist, that here we have an example of how a thing regarded in itself may seem evil, but in relation to a larger content, good. We may concede this without hesitation. Just as the moral imperfection of the parts was consonant with the mechanical, so it might be with the aesthetic perfection of the whole. Instead of regarding nature as a mere machine, indifferent to good and evil, we might regard her as an artist equally gratified in both. Appreciative audience of her own actions, she might applaud the dramatic propriety of all, finding the villain as necessary to the value of her play as the hero, and prizing him accordingly. But granted all this, it throws no more light on the problem of reconciling moral evil to a moral absolute than did the congruity of sin and suffering with the mechanical perfection of the physical order. Indeed, to resolve the opposition between good and evil into a harmonious difference of complementary artistic effects is merely to drape naturalism rather diaphanously with the pathetic fallacy. The world that admires all its parts as equally appropriate to its aesthetic perfections possesses the same ethical significance as that in which all are regarded as equally necessary and characteristic features in the operation of its mechanism. To neither world are moral values applicable or relevant.

The analogy, then, from aesthetic, as that from natural perfection, may be dismissed, so far as the argument is concerned. In the one case as in the other, any apparent pertinence rests upon an ambiguity in the use of the term "good" or "perfect"; and wherever the figure is correctly and strictly developed, it discredits the point it is employed to illustrate. It is in moral

experience alone, then, whence all possibility of equivocation has been excluded, that we can find, if anywhere, the justification of the absolutist's contention. And here it is that we are confronted immediately with a number of facts which, as it seems to him, irrefutably bear out his position. The very pleasurable-ness of pleasure, he points out, depends upon an antithesis of pain. There can be no satisfaction without a preparation of dissatisfaction; no sense of beauty except in opposition to ugliness; no virtue which is really virtuous without vicious tendencies; no merit without temptation and struggle. And, finally, there is the supreme fact that we enjoy the struggle; that we take pleasure in pain and labour; that peace is only peace if it be wrung from conflict.

It is evident that it is only with this last argument that we need really deal if we so choose. For, granting the interdependence of contraries which is the gist of the first series of contentions, we may well ask whether here again we have anything more than another restatement of the problem of evil. To say that there can be no pleasure without pain, beauty without ugliness, good conduct without vicious propensities, or perfect activity except in overcoming obstacles, is not necessarily to show how imperfection may be transubstantiated into perfection, but might be taken as merely an emphatic demonstration that the world is imperfectly constituted.

The pessimist will say frankly that such a world is not worth what it costs. The majority of men, while willing to pay what they do for it, are responsive to Leonardo's cry, "O God, that sellest us goods at a price of great weariness." They would beat the world down if they could. To naïve common sense, at least, it seems as if it were just this fact that everything had to be bargained for and nothing valuable was free in which, from the point of view of morals, the imperfection of nature consisted. In a perfect nature the good would be free as air, and all activities would be naturally directed through happy performance to happy results.

Still, these statements of the interdependence of contraries are not only irrelevant but specious in themselves; and, if only in the interest of a pleasanter view of life, it will be well for us to

stop a moment and try to dispose of them. The first point, the interdependence of pleasure and pain and of satisfaction and dissatisfaction, seems capable of an obvious *reductio ad absurdum*. If they be not independent feelings, and can only be expressed in reference to one another, it is pertinent to query how they could enter experience at all. For neither can exist prior to the other, yet one must come first.

Moreover this linkage is not borne out by introspection. There are mixed pleasures, indeed, but there are quite as obviously pure pleasures, even on the physical plane. The comfort of a good digestion, for example, is neither constituted nor enhanced by the memories of indigestion. Nor is it necessary to suffer intermittently with melancholia to enjoy living.

To the pure pleasures, again, all the aesthetic and intellectual pleasures would seem to belong. There is nothing in experience to corroborate the statement that beauty is beauty only in contrast to what is not beautiful. One does not have to know the worst in order to enjoy the best in art. The musical chord is not more pleasing because one has heard discords, the painting more delightful because one has seen chromolithographs. Nor is the idea which suddenly flashes upon one a whit less thrilling than that which is painfully precipitated by a racking brain.

We have then discovered a large class of goods neither the existence nor the essence of which is in any way conditioned or constituted by the presence of evil. The aesthetic, the intellectual, and many physical satisfactions may be quite unconscious of any conquest over any antagonist, and may be revealed by a kind of grace which exacts nothing in return. To state, then, that the value of all perfection is to be estimated in direct proportion to the price paid for it is too hasty and sweeping. And to ask whether the value of any perfection is properly so to be appraised becomes now our task. Hence we turn to examine the last stronghold of the absolutist, the case of moral excellence.

Here the *prima facie* evidence is against us. It cannot be denied that the value of virtue seems to depend upon the existence of vice and to be enhanced by it. If there were no moral evil, there could be no moral good. For virtue consists in conquering

vice; merit is the fruit of struggle; character is made by temptation and suffering.

But cross-examination reveals that we are not really confronted with a good which gets its essential goodness from wrestling with its contrary. The "moral character" of a good turns out upon inquiry to mean no new kind of good, but rather to express an accidental and undesirable relation in which the sovereign good stands to the will. It signifies that the good is unattained and insecure. It presents it as something to be wrung from the midst of adverse conditions, and consecrates the pursuit of it as imperative. Virtue, in a word, is remedial. Could it attain its end and eradicate vice, it would, it is true, itself cease. But in losing its life it would have found it. Activities would have become easy which before were laboured, conduct natural which before was artificial. In such a transfiguration, surely nothing valuable would have been lost. We should be at last in undisputed possession of that the value of attaining which alone made virtue worth while, or indeed differentiated it as such from other behaviour. Virtue then might well take leave of us in the words of Virgil's parting with Dante:

Non aspettar mio dir più, nè mio cenno.
 Libero, dritto e sano è lo tuo arbitrio,
 E fallo fora non fare a suo senno;
 Per ch' io te sopra te corono e mitrio.

The case of merit is even more striking. As a matter of fact we do become perfect through temptation and suffering. This is what the moral life means. But are we entitled to conclude that because we are better *post hoc*, we are therefore better *propter hoc*? Is not merit based upon the state actually attained, and not upon the struggle by which we have attained it?

It is certainly difficult to disassociate merit from its antecedents, and to distinguish the extrinsic conditions under which it is displayed from its intrinsic value. Yet this failure to discriminate between means and ends, and a consequent inversion of their relations, is of great mischief to philosophic thought. There can be no merit without temptation. Granted. It is but a special instance of the interdependence of virtue and vice. But in the

instance, as in general, the value is prospective, not retrospective. We merit, not because we have merely conquered temptation, but because the victory has brought us nearer the ideal. It is from the fruits, not the fact, of victory that our merit comes. An indiscriminate slaughter of desires for the mere sake of seeing the blood run has nothing noble or meritorious about it. Yet did merit and character depend upon the overcoming and not upon the nature of the adversary, the man who fought all right desire down would be as perfected through suffering as he who suppressed all wrong; and if he had the harder time and stubborn contest in his task, even more so. Sound comment upon this view is the rebellious proposition of one of the many philosophic *enfants terribles* cradled by the University of Paris in the fourteenth century: "That God can order a rational creature to hate him, and it in obeying him acquires more merit than if it loved him at his command, *quoniam hoc faceret majori conatu et contra propriam inclinationem.*"

It is as noble, however, to be conquered by good inclinations as to conquer bad ones. The fight is worth fighting only if and because it advances us toward the ideal. We may, to be sure, enjoy the fight for its own sake, but the pleasure can be adjudged good only if the cause be worthy.

In fine, are we not dealing again with the old confusion of natural with moral perfection, instanced here in a failure to distinguish between the strength and the moral direction of the will? There is, it is assumed, a kind of moral excellence in mere withstanding; and the character which is confirmed in power through such overcoming is intrinsically better than that which is spontaneously right. But on what possible moral ground is so-called strength of character admirable save as a means to moral rectitude? Given an imperfect will, in which the habit of right action is not innate but has to be acquired, and merit depends upon struggle, since perfection is attained through struggle. Given a perfect will, naturally endowed with rectitude, not beset with temptations, and unhindered by obstacles, exercising itself in a wholly favourable world, and with the temptation and the struggle all merit if you like, as all virtue, will have disappeared. But all that made the struggle with temptation and adversity meritorious, and made

the temptation and the suffering themselves valuable discipline, will remain. The disposition to right action and an environment wholly gracious and responsive to it, which it is the aim and justification of the moral life to foster and establish, will still, or rather will at length, exist. Only, man will come naturally by that to the acquirement of which moral action is a necessary means in an imperfect world, and by its subservience to which its moral goodness is alone defined.

Again, the intrinsic value of the means is not altered by their necessity as conditions of acquiring the good. That evil is indispensable to the attainment of the good, or brings forth good in the end, does not make it any the less evil. The necessity, for example, or the prospective success of an operation, are not anaesthetics. Nay more, however necessary and however successful the operation may have been, the medical record of the patient is the worse for having had to undergo it. In like manner one may be made perfect through sin and suffering, but one's history as a whole is the less clean and satisfactory for their incidence. Else why repent of the sins through which one has found grace, or talk of the "sufferings" which have ministered to one's restoration to health, or, for that matter, if one be truly philosophic, even of a "restoration." And however happy the eventual dénouement of the world-process may be, that process, seen "under the aspect of eternity," cannot but be marred by the pain and wrong through which its salvation has been worked out. It is the old Aristotelian opposition between the οὐ ἔνεκα and the οὐ οὐκ ἀνευ with which we are dealing. But Aristotle was not blind to their true relations. He saw quite clearly that if evil be necessary to the existence of the good, then the good is rendered incomplete and the world imperfect by the very conditions which render them possible.

If it be not true that in losing their lives virtue and merit shall find them again in the spontaneous perfection of a new heaven and a new earth, the whole moral life is stultified. For it aims at nothing less than the elimination of evil altogether, and hence at suicide. And if evil be an element in the good, beyond this death there is no happy immortality. The end of moral action becomes the extinction of all that makes it valuable, each

partial conquest is but an advance towards ultimate defeat, each so-called betterment of the world no more than a blow at the foundation of its goodness. Thus the sustaining vision of our lives is an Agamemnon's dream, luring us to catastrophe under the guise of victory; or, to change the figure, we think that in overcoming evil we are soaring upwards, when we are really only cutting from beneath us the ground on which we stand.

It is no question here of whether or not the ideal be attainable. That is irrelevant to our argument. To pursue an unattainable ideal may be natural and noble, provided only that in its attainment our nature would find its perfection and peace. The point at issue is far graver. It is not that to pursue the ideal is criticized as vain, but that to have an ideal at all is implied to be irrational. For to desire that the attainment of which would involve the annihilation of all that makes it desirable is madness. Yet, if our opponent be right, it is just this which we naturally desire, and in proportion as our will becomes moral and our aspirations rational, consciously worship and pursue.

It is not surprising, however, that the confusion of means with ends, or of medicine with food—the figure may be infinitely varied—should take place. We live not in a perfect but an imperfect world, and we incorporate the ideal with our lives only by a long process of struggle with and triumph over obstacles. The good we find is worth the labour of producing it. In this wise the means gain a fictitious glamour from their relation to the end. Concomitants and conditions of realizing the good, they come to be regarded as contributive not only to its existence but to its character. We fancy that because we are better because of the struggle in one sense, we are better because of it in the other; that is, that since we become better *by means of* the struggle, we are better for having had to go through with it. By persistently making the best, then, of the exigencies forced upon us by imperfection, judging them as we do in the light of their results and their uses rather than of their intrinsic values, we are the more predisposed to agree to the philosopher's assertion that they are positive elements of perfection, especially if his appeal be adorned with solemn and religious imagery. Nay, we are ready to yield a sentimental acquiescence when he con-

justifies us to invert the relation between means and ends altogether; to believe the end to be valuable merely as a stimulus to the struggle for it, and to conceive the good to be good only in so far as it is not attained.

The absolutist, however, will stand manfully by his position. It is we, he persists, who are inverting the relation between means and end, not he. The true end is in truth the wrestle with obstacles, the sweat, the panting, the resistance, the joy in it all. No other pleasure is so sweet, no other so noble. To the battle the vision of victory is but an incentive. The good lies in the battle itself. The palm withers as soon as it is won.

The psychology upon which this argument rests is sound enough as far as it goes. There can be no doubt that we enjoy activity for activity's sake. We like not only what the struggle brings us but the feel of the struggle as well. Indeed we often enjoy the game more than its prize. Upon this fact, too—upon the enjoyment, as it were, of making money for the pleasure of business—rests largely the plausibility of the method we were discussing in the last paragraph of estimating the value of existence by its expensiveness.

But we may raise a doubt at once as to the pertinence of this experience to the question in hand. In the first place one might turn against the absolutist his own objection to our insistence upon the painful elements involved in some struggle. We might remind him that, given his premises, he has no more right to hail as a real good the joy in the conflict or the triumph than have we to stigmatize suffering and failure as real evil. He denies the real or ultimate character of evil on the same grounds that we might deny the real or ultimate character of what he makes a good. The evil in the struggle, he tells us, is not ultimately evil, because it is overcome in the absolute life. Its real value, then, depends upon the end it subserves. And, as we have already pointed out, there is no other reason for considering the joy in the struggle a real or ultimate good. On the other hand, if it be admitted that the joy of a successful tussle be a suitable characteristic of absolute perfection, it would seem as if the absolutist were in reason bound to grant in return that what pain or seeming defeat may be involved therein is as real, as ultimate, and as

absolute. In last resort the relativity of the two values or their absoluteness should stand or fall together.

The vital objection to the argument, however, challenges not so much the premises or the experience upon which it rests as the correctness of the inference or interpretation it makes. We may acknowledge gladly the suitability of the pleasure in work and struggle to a perfected life. We have no more desire than the absolutist to sit down forever in Spencer's "lady-like, tea-table Elysium." A perfected world does not mean a world in which there is nothing more to do; it means only a world in which we always enjoy our work. But it would seem impossible to find any antithesis of good and evil in such work, however hard. In the labour we delight in there is no pain to physic, so far as we truly delight in it and find it an unalloyed good. It is at this point that the absolutist's interpretation seems faulty. He appears to forget that the most breathless struggle, at the moment when it becomes an end in itself, becomes as pure an *ἐνέργεια ἀκίνησις* as the most silent contemplation. To keep pace with the wind is to float ever in halcyon calm. In that tempestuous activity, that glorious strain and stress, that jubilant hurling of obstacles to one side, there is no experience of evil whatsoever. The difficulties which we enjoy overcoming are not enemies but friends. In our wrestle with them there is no misfortune, no mutilation of our purpose, no thwarting of our will. It is a sport; not the painful pursuit of a good, but the possession and enjoyment of it. Such activity is quite different from the grim life and death struggle with evil. There the enemy is no welcome adversary but a hated foe. We do not want him; we want rather to be rid of him. He is not the necessary condition of pleasurable exercise, but must be chased from the field before the sport can really begin. What distinguishes the moral life from a truly free and perfected activity is just the fact that the obstacles it involves are hindrances, not helps, to happy self-expression; that its struggles we do not enjoy; and that its victories are won at a cost of self-curtailment and sacrifice of possible good. No sleight of hand can juggle it into the semblance of a sport nor philosophic incantation civilize the devil into a friendly opponent in an exciting and delightful game.

But it is into such a friendly and welcome adversary that the devil is necessarily reformed in the absolute experience. For were there any contest with evil *qua* evil, the absolute would not be perfect. His experience would have in it something, we must insist, which he had rather have out. However, if evil be merely the welcome obstacle, necessary condition of sport and victory, it is hard to see how he can have any moral value for us. We are butchered to make his holiday. That his experience includes and feels directly our sufferings is no sanctification either of it or of them. On the contrary, if he share the pains he inflicts and enjoys, his life is beyond the pale not only of the moral but of the sane.

In any case, moreover, we have no access to his perfected experience, no share in his victory, no thrill of his joy. Nay, we cannot hope to know and share them; for were we happy, there would be no suffering for him to transcend, and hence no victory and no felicity. It is this last fact which adds insult to the injury already done the moral ideal. Were he merely himself untroubled by what troubles us, or unruffled even, and without compunction at the sight of our unhappiness, we might deal with him as we deal with a mechanical world. The moral life would not be forced indeed to violent and tropical growth, but neither would it be dulled and blighted. As he is, however, human aspiration must move ever in the shadow. For as he is, the only thing that could trouble him would be that we should be untroubled. Nothing whatever could mar his happiness save our own.

We are forced then to disallow this supreme appeal of the absolutist to the moral life as no more convincing than his invocation of the aesthetic interests. Not only does inspection of ethical experience fail to assist us toward the desired solution of the problem, but it invalidates, as we have seen, the conclusions it is employed to support. We cannot find there, more than in aesthetics and psychology, any justification for that paradoxical snobbishness which refuses to bow to the good unless it have evil relatives or forbears. On the contrary, in the light of ethics also this attitude is seen to be due not to a keen eye for worth and dignity, but rather to an incomplete, if not mistaken,

knowledge of who's who. Not only are there some goods which are pure of any base admixture, but it is these which set the type and standard for all goods so far as they have been able to live down their pasts and lose all trace of their origins. Evil then appears as something which, by definition, refuses amalgamation with or inclusion in the good. And in no experience fulfilling our demand for moral perfection can we find any place for it at all; nor in any possessing even a sympathetic moral meaning can we conceive it as appearing as other than a defect. We must conclude that if the absolute is to be one in value, and yet to include within himself all distinctions of value, he can be and do so only by turning these distinctions into mere differences of equally valuable, and therefore, so far as we are concerned, equally valueless facts. In fine, a monistic view of the world cannot give any cosmic significance or metaphysical import to the moral life. The only possible monism is naturalistic; the only possible pantheism a moral indifferentism.

The significance of this conclusion for metaphysics in general must be clear. If it be valid, it must eliminate once and for all the ethical monist variety of absolutism from the list of possible systems. Thought indeed would seem to be restricted to one of two directions. It must choose in last resort between, on the one hand, an explicitly—or at any rate an implicitly—naturalistic interpretation of reality, which, though it deprives the moral life of cosmic sympathy and superhuman meaning, yet leaves the interests and ideals upon which it rests vital and convincing so far as human life is concerned; and, on the other, a pluralism which, though it may supply metaphysical justification to our preferences and divine encouragement to our aspirations, still disrupts beyond hope of philosophic repair the single-heartedness of the world.

THE MINISTER AND HIS PEOPLE

PHILLIPS BROOKS

The Faculty of the Harvard Divinity School provided for their students in 1883 six lectures by officers of the University representing other departments of government and instruction, as follows:

The Minister and the People: Phillips Brooks, D.D., of the Board of Overseers.

The Evolution of a Christian Minister: J. F. Clarke, D.D., of the Board of Overseers.

One Word more about Free-Will: William James, M.D., Assistant Professor of Philosophy.

Plato's Idea of Immortality: W. W. Goodwin, LL.D., Professor of Greek.

The Natural History of Altruism: N. S. Shaler, S.D., Professor of Palaeontology.

Vivisection: H. P. Bowditch, M.D., Professor of Physiology, and Dean of the Medical Faculty.

The first of this series was delivered by Phillips Brooks on the evening of February 21, in the Chapel of the Divinity School; and no one who was present can forget the profound impression of candor, insight, searching of the heart of youth, and self-revelation of the speaker's heart, which the address conveyed. At its hearing the effect of simplicity and spontaneity was irresistible, but closer study reveals the firm structure and steady movement of predetermined thought which give permanent dignity to the most casual addresses of Phillips Brooks. The lecture was fortunately recorded by an unusually skilful stenographer, and was published in the *Christian Register* of February 28, from which it is here reprinted with the consent of the proprietor. Its subject, its relation to the Harvard Divinity School, and its undiminished timeliness, appear to justify its reproduction.—Ed.

You will excuse me if I begin by expressing a little surprise and embarrassment at the audience which I see before me. Some months ago, when I had the privilege of conducting the service at the college chapel, the President asked me if I would some time in the spring give a talk to the theological students. I said

I would with the greatest pleasure in the world, and now I scarcely recognize the occasion. You will understand, therefore, that I came simply supposing that I was to meet a group of young men devoted to the work which seems to me to be the best work to which a man can give his life. I shall venture to address you all as if you were theological students—or I shall venture to speak to those who *are* theological students—and to speak altogether from the experience of a minister who has been engaged in parish work for a good many years. I come to you precisely as one might come who knew that a body of men had been engaged in the scientific study of agriculture, and who came as a practical worker himself to speak of the things which he had found most useful in his actual labor in the field.

I cannot begin without congratulating those to whom I speak upon the work which lies before them, and assuring them of the perpetual richness and growing life of that profession in which they are engaged. I cannot begin without assuring them that everything that is in the promise of that profession is more than realized in the actual operation of it; and also of my deep conviction that the time has not come, and will never come, when the work of the Christian ministry will be obsolete. I believe that there is every promise of a larger work for the Christian minister to-day than has ever been in the past. Otherwise I should speak in despair, if I spoke at all.

And yet one of the first things that comes before us, as we think of the work of the theological student and Christian minister, is the great changes that have come in the nature of his work. I am reminded at once, as I begin, of the largely prevailing conception there is of the difference which has come in the relations which the Christian minister holds to his people and to the community. As we look back and see the position which he held fifty years ago, we are constantly reminded of this difference. We are told a great many anecdotes of the way he stood then, of the prestige which clothed his position, of the authority with which it was invested. We are then pointed to the great changes that have taken place, in which the minister has been stripped of all that prestige, and has no such authority clothing the utterances which he gives from the pulpit.

There are two ways of regarding that change, both of which I should discourage. One of them is the supposition that there has come to be a lamentable deficiency, a great falling away; that the minister does not occupy that position which he once occupied. I remember a clergyman who was an old man just at the time when very many who are now becoming old were very young—I remember hearing this remark repeated, which he made to one who was just going into the ministry: "It has been my exceeding good fortune to have my ministry just at the best time. I entered when it was at its highest degree of prestige, and had the good fortune to leave it just as it lost its prestige and influence." It was not a very cordial word for a young man who was entering it.

Then there is an entirely different tone upon the other side—a sort of congratulation that that earlier prestige has passed away, and rejoicing that man can now stand before his fellow-man without any of the artificial discriminations that used to belong to the ministry years ago.

It seems to me that both of these methods of regarding the change that has taken place are superficial, and that there is something a great deal deeper to be said about them. We are bound, I think, to recognize that there is a distinct progress going on, and that the old position has a true relation to the new position in which the minister stands today. The old position in which the minister stood, clothed in a certain recognized authority which had its visible symbols, seems to me to have been the crude anticipation of the position in which the minister stands today.

We may say that the changes that are going on are in general of one great sort. Both Christian doctrine and Christian institutions are leaving off their arbitrary forms and showing their essential conditions. Things manifest themselves in their arbitrary forms first, and afterward show themselves in their essential conditions. Take, for instance, one or two of the Christian doctrines, and we can see how the change has taken place. There was a time when man was supposed to be appointed to fixed, certain, and precise conditions in the other world—the condition of those who were saved and the condition of those who were lost. It was an arbitrary condition, and one difficult to anticipate.

It was a distinction which one found it very difficult to apply to his own life. I believe today that men are looking forward to another life, believing that moral issues are to rule in that life as they rule here; that man's destiny is fixed there according to his nature, and not according to any arbitrary judgment which it is impossible for him to anticipate. The two worlds are thus brought together in healthier association, so that men live today in healthier anticipation and with a more impressive sanction of the other life than they have lived in the past.

So take the other Christian doctrines. It seems to me that the change we find in them all is the change from the arbitrary to the essential; the change from that which rests upon the will to that which has its root in the very nature of things. This fact, applied to the position of the Christian minister, must be the keynote, the principle that solves and makes clear the whole.

With that point in view, I want to speak of the relation of the minister to his people. I shall speak of his relation to the intelligence of his people, to the property of his people, and to the consciences of his people.

When I say "his people," I recognize that there is no such constraint upon the minister today as there has been in times past; that one of the healthier processes of the position which he holds today is the opening of his influence; that he has a right to exercise it today in ways which were not open to him in other days.

Let me try at the outset to give one designation or definition which shall apply to it all. It seems to me that what we want to say about the relation of the minister to the people now is that it is vastly more human and vastly less ecclesiastical than in the past. That is one result in which we may rejoice. There are certain relations which men hold in view of their common humanity—relations between men of different kinds of intellect and of different stations in life; and all these are in the very nature of their human life. Now I conceive the Christian Church to be simply humanity struggling forward to the realization of its own idea. I cannot conceive it to be something distinct from humanity. I think of it, when it has come to completion, as humanity come to its completion. The Christian Church has suffered all its worst effects and worst corruptions from separating itself

from humanity. Whenever the Church has conceived of itself as possessing privileges which do not potentially belong to the whole human race, it has immediately sunk into corruption. The true and healthy Church, separating everything that is corrupt from its life—the true Church is simply humanity beginning its work, and gradually forming within itself a nucleus of that which is ultimately to embrace the whole human race.

When I say that the relation of the preacher has become more human, it seems to me that I say that this process is going forward, and that the Christian minister stands as a man toward men, as a man in relation to his fellow-men, and not as the creature of some artificial organization. I wish I could make you bear that in mind as I go on. The relation between the Christian minister and the people who are around him is simply the relation between a certain man, put in a peculiar and helpful attitude to his fellow-men. It is not something organized by churches and councils, but is something rising from human nature itself.

What relation then does the minister hold with regard to the intelligence of the people around him?

There are only two positions a man can hold with regard to the intelligence of his fellow-men. He can either be the depository of truth, holding it and dealing it out to them, or he can be a fellow-student of truth, seeking for it just as they seek for it. These are the only two relations which he can hold to his fellow-men with regard to the attainment of truth and its distribution. We know how largely the first idea prevails in the Christian world today. The Christian Church is conceived as a depository of infallible truth, which it is to dispense to men who stand waiting with open ears and open eyes to receive it.

The first assertion of Protestantism is that there is no such depository of truth. It is a matter of deep congratulation that the recognition of this fact has been going forward all through the centuries. Every one of the reformations of the Church has been the dislodgement of that infallibility from some fortress in which it has intrenched itself, and the opening of the enlarged idea that man is seeking always the truth by the exercise of his faculties consecrated to the service of the divine will.

The Romanist turns to us, and says: "See to what you have

reduced the search for truth! Is there no being, no group of individuals who are authorized to declare certainty with regard to the great things which are forever pressing upon the human soul; with regard to the nature of the human soul itself, with regard to its relations to the great future, with regard to that mysterious event which came in the manifestation of Jesus Christ upon earth?" The Protestant Reformation, among historic movements, then shows how afterward men tried to lodge infallibility in the Bible, and to believe that there was an infallible record which could be appealed to.

The great point of our present belief is that there is no such infallible record anywhere, in church, or council, or book; that man has been sent here to strive after truth, not by any necessity to be sure that he has come to the ultimate truth in regard to these great final problems of the human soul.

Is that a dreadful or a welcome thing? Is it something that closes the gates upon man's knowledge, or is it something that opens them? It seems to me that for a man to set out to seek after truth, never sure that he shall find it with perfect infallibility, always sure that he shall grow into greater capacity to use it, is the noblest position in which a man can be placed in regard to the great problems of the human soul.

In such a condition as that, what is the relation of the preacher to the intelligence of the men who are around him? It is certainly not to stand and deal forth that which by his utterance has an infallible warrant. It is simply the attitude of one who, with superior opportunities, stands and guides his fellow-men in their search for truth.

The function of the minister in relation to the intelligence of the people is threefold:

1. In the first place, he must awaken their spiritual activity.
2. In the second place, he must give them the results of his study.
3. In the third place, he must lift their life to the higher tone which Christianity assures.

Look at each one of these three.

1. First, he is to awaken the spiritual activity, the insight, the real desire to know with regard to the highest things. When we

look around upon our fellow-men, we see that the one thing that presses on us most is not the extent of men's ignorance: it is their indifference. It is that so many men are wrapped up in the things of the present life; that to all that vast region which we know exists beyond they are wholly indifferent. To awaken the spiritual sense, to make them care for unseen things, to make them long for some sort of entrance into that great reality which they feel around them—that is the great function of the Christian minister. Even if he had nothing distinctly to tell of certainty with regard to this truth, the mere awakening of men in their own blind way to search for religious truth would be one of the noblest things he could do.

Mr. Matthew Arnold a few months ago analyzed Mr. Emerson; and the result of his teaching was this. He said that Mr. Emerson, although he might not be as great in some points as some of us thought, was great in this: that he was "the friend and helper of those who would live in the spirit." That criticism of Mr. Arnold upon Mr. Emerson was very largely criticized. It seemed to some that he had degraded the philosopher. It seemed to me that this objection was a melancholy sort of criticism upon the standards that we have in this life.

Is there a nobler thing than when a critic comes and says of him whom I reverence and honor that he was the friend and helper of those who would live in the spirit? It seems to me that he said something infinitely greater than if he had said that he wrought the noblest system of philosophy that has been framed in the world. The man that is doing the best work for mankind today is the guide and friend of those who live in the spirit.

Then we may be able to take one step further, and know that there has been one manifestation of the spiritual life in this world that surpasses all other manifestations. Whatever may be our theological conceptions in regard to him, we know that Jesus Christ stands as the supreme inspirer of the spiritual life; and he who would be today the guide and friend of those who would live in the spirit must of necessity turn to Jesus Christ and put himself in relation to his spiritual life. There is where the minister becomes a Christian minister—in the simple desire, through contact with the life and work and death of Jesus Christ, to stir

the soul and the spiritual life of man. The testimony of all ages is that there has been no such spiritual power as Jesus Christ.

That is the first work, then, of the minister: to reach the spiritual sense and to stir it to some kind of activity.

2. What is the second one? It is his duty to know something that those to whom he ministers do not know. Just as the professor in some department devotes himself to its study and gives to mankind that which he finds in that department, so it would be a strange thing if a minister, set apart to study a special work, had not something to tell men which they did not know. Not that that implies any infallibility in the Christian minister, but simply the education of a consecrated life in the highest things which engage the intelligence of mankind. The minister who simply stands before men and says, "You must be spiritual, but I can tell you nothing about spiritual things," is absolutely false to his function. What may we tell men in regard to spiritual things? We may tell them how the whole history of mankind has been permeated and filled with spiritual things. We may show how mankind has always done the best in intellectual regions when it has been filled full of spiritual influence. We may scatter such a foolish belief as exists in men's minds today with regard to the possible extension of the Christian faith around the world—the superficial objectors to foreign missions who are ready to believe, without any just comparison, that there is a religion on the face of the earth today that can for a moment compare with the religion of Jesus Christ in all its conceptions or forms, taken as one great whole. We may show how the history of the Christian Church is a necessary part of the intelligence of humanity today. These are but a part of the simple information, the mere instruction, which the Christian minister can give.

3. Then just one thing more. It is his place to elevate the tone of life everywhere; to bring it into contact with those sublime principles which are essential to humanity, which are struggling to the surface of human life everywhere, and have come to their best manifestations in Christianity—patience, long suffering, large charity, and, above all things, hopefulness. The perpetual tendency of the world to lose its hopefulness is one of the things which the Christian minister, by every power in his life, is bound

to resist. I can understand a Christian minister denying almost the essentials of the Christian faith; I can understand a minister teaching things from a Christian pulpit which I feel to be untrue; but I do not see how a man can take the place of a Christian minister unless he is inspired by a spirit of deep hopefulness in regard to the human race, always believing that man is the child of God; that his fortunes are fastened to the deep fortunes of the world; and, unless the whole is rotten—unless there is nothing which has an assured future to it—man, bound by the conditions of his life, being a child of God, must be a creature of perpetual hope.

Now when one says to me that I have lost much that the Christian minister in other times used to have; when one says to me that I am not able to speak with the authority with which a Christian minister used to speak, so that my life is gone and my function is useless, I turn to these three things: It is my place to awaken and to make active the spiritual sense of men; to tell men everything that I have found with regard to spiritual truth; and to make men hope with every possible assertion of their relation to the highest and divinest which it is in my power to make. Is not that something to fill a man's life in the Christian ministry—each man fulfilling it in his own way, but every man doing those three things, and so becoming a protest against the lowest in humanity, and a continual assertion of the highest?

Before I leave this first part of my subject, I cannot help saying that, after all, I myself feel that the relation to his people is not the deepest relation which a minister holds. Almost all the errors of the Christian ministry, almost all the heresies of the Christian Church, if we really retain that word in its true meaning, have come from supposing that man's relation to his fellow-man may be superior to his loyalty to the truth. It is the reversal of that order again and again in Christian history that has led to the worst things that have happened to the Christian Church.

There was a time when men believed that they must assert certain doctrines which they only half held, because they thought that if those doctrines were not asserted men would go to ruin. Largely under that sense of duty and that impulse and belief was the doctrine of the necessary everlasting punishment of certain

souls asserted year after year. You went to a man and said, "What is the ground upon which you preach the necessary everlasting perdition of certain souls?" What was the answer? "Because if you do not preach it, men will sin; because if you do not believe that that is true"—for I may not charge men with simple blank hypocrisy—"if you do not believe that that is true, sinners have no sufficient motive to repent." I say that any man who rightly perceives the relation which mankind sustains to truth knows that this is an argument which had no place there. My business is to seek and find the truth, and to leave it to God to guard that it shall not ruin the lives of men.

Does not the same error appear also to-day upon the other side? When any man today makes less exacting, less earnest or imperative, any one of the statements of truth or divine justice and righteousness, in order that his fellow-men may be induced to do the less when he thinks that they will not be induced to do the greater; when any man pares down doctrine or truth, in order that men may be induced to believe that which alone he thinks they are fitted to believe—then it is sacrificing the love of truth for the sake of men. No man has any right to make that which he believes to be the truth of God any less exacting, less sharp or clear, because he thinks his fellow-men will not accept it if he states it in its blankest and baldest form.

I read an incident in a newspaper the other day that seems to me to illustrate this point. A tired and dusty traveller was leaning against a lamp-post in the city of Rochester, and he turned and looked around him and said, "How far is it to Farmington?" and a boy in the crowd said, "Eight miles." "Do you think it is so far as that?" said the poor tired traveller. "Well, seeing that you are so tired, I will call it seven miles." The boy, with his heart overflowing with the milk of human kindness, pitied the exhausted traveller, and chose to call it seven miles. I know I have seen statements of the truth that have been dictated by the same motive. Never make the road from Rochester to Farmington seven miles, when you know it is eight. Do not do a wrong to truth out of regard for men.

There is another point, if one may speak out of his own ministry and from observation of the ministry of others: men do

not *dread* to believe, men *long* to believe. The one thing that we do not have to do is to pare down the truth for man's capacity to believe. Give them all the truth: you cannot make it too exacting. The whole of Christian history has been full of testimony that you may claim your fellow-men by virtue of the very imperiousness and absoluteness of that which they have been called upon to believe. The old *credo quia impossibile* of Tertullian had philosophy in it. Men long to believe; and, while ultimately every healthy human faculty will reject that which is not congenial to it, you cannot help men better than by laying before them all that which is true, even in its blankest and most uncompromising form. Just as there are many men whom you cannot get to go down the street for you, but who would go half the way around the world for you if you needed it, so there are men who would not accept the truth which they felt had been pared down for them; but, when you put before them God in his eternity and infinitude and the soul in its vastness and mystery, then the power of belief, stirred to its greatest task, lifts itself up and does its work.

I pass now to something subordinate and inferior to the point in regard to the intelligence of men—the relation of the Christian minister to the property of those to whom he ministers. Many seem to think that he has the property of a large part of the community at his disposal; certainly of all that part of the community that is associated with him. If I were to do half the things with other people's money that I am asked to do every year, I should impoverish the city of Boston.

It seems to me that the minister is simply called upon to count his people as stewards of the Highest; not to be the distributor or almoner of other people's goods, but to make other men such, by the spiritual things which I have been trying to describe, that they shall enter into the privilege of doing that which has been intrusted to them in the highest use to which it can be employed. No man deals properly with a man until he accounts him more than his property. "I seek not yours, but you," said Paul. The spiritual life, the good of men, the good of the soul—that is the thing that the Christian minister is to seek.

The result of having something to do with that will be that

sordid coffers will flow forth and bless the world. It is the old story of Sir Launfal,

Who gives himself with his alms feeds three,—
Himself, his hungry neighbor, and me.

Give yourself with your gift. Something is gained if you get a man's five hundred dollars here and there; but it is not the work of a Christian minister. Let other people go and beg for money without the slightest regard of the way in which it is bestowed; but it is for the Christian minister to make a man know himself capable of consecration, and then to make him consecrate himself, which must include the property which he possesses. This, it seems to me, is the only definition which we can give of the relation of the Christian minister to the property of those to whom he ministers. He must work through the characters and natures of his people. Again and again a man has lost the power to do that work by the way in which he has been appealing to the individual. I will stand before my congregation and tell them of the glory of charity. I will tell them what a grand thing it is to give for God, then let them do the good for themselves, and go forth and give of their means; but I will not go to a man in any way that can possibly involve my personality, knowing that he will give out of friendship to me, and extort one dollar or five hundred from him for the best of objects.

And here, it seems to me, comes in one great function of the Christian minister that I hope all of you will not forget; which is that you must have such a large interest in great human necessities that you should be able to inform those that are able to give how to bestow their goods. The Christian minister has no right to shut himself up in ecclesiastical interests. He is bound to consider everything that relates to humanity, and to consider that a dollar that is given to the sufferers in Louisville is as consecrated a dollar as that which is given for an altar or a font. The minister stands in a position in which he can bring information to men that they might not have otherwise. To bring that information by the powers which he can wield over the spiritual life, and to make men feel called to give just as soon as they see that they should give—that is all, it seems to me, that the Christian minister has to do with the property of the community.

And, if one can again bear testimony out of his own experience, I can say that there is a wonderful *readiness* to give. It seems to me that the one great thing that we lack is sufficient information in regard to the things which money can be devoted to. The advocate of every great cause is apt to be dishonest—unconsciously dishonest—and to represent his cause as greater in proportion than others around it. That is the way in which the minister can stand between his people and such advocates, and show them the comparative importance of objects brought before them.

And now I pass to consider the relation of the Christian minister to the conscience of the community. The conscience of the community is nothing but the aggregate conscience of individuals. When we speak of that, we open a large and sometimes dark page of human history. We talk of the abuses of the priesthood in other times. I think we have no idea of the clamor that was made then upon the priests to guide other people's consciences. The Christian minister is not so much bound to refrain from asserting a claim upon the consciences of men as he is bound not to allow himself to be the master of their consciences. It is one of the embarrassments of the intelligent, spiritual minister that people are so ready to put their consciences under the control of others. I am sure if we could go back into the ages which we abuse most, the time when the priesthood set themselves over the consciences of men, we should find that the real trouble came from men and women who were seeking to be thus guided. It is the education of the great mass of the people so that they have felt themselves called upon to accept the great responsibility of the guidance of their own consciences that has released the clergy, rather than the disposition of the clergy themselves.

Just as soon as we talk of the relation of the Church to the consciences of mankind, I suppose we are called upon to make that division which must always be made when we talk about sinfulness. There are two classes of wrong-doing, two classes of sin. One comprises those sins which have no intrinsic good, which are always wrong whenever they are done; the other comprises those things which are harmful to the individual soul or are harmful to other people, and are therefore not right to be done. There are certain things that no man, under any circum-

stances or in any age, should ever consider right to be done. There are some things of which, if a man should ask me why I do not do them, I should say, "They are absolutely wrong." Of other things I should say, "I know, if I did it, I should be a less upright, less holy man; and I know that I have no right to do it." "Do you pronounce it to be absolutely wrong?" "No." Some things are wrong in the eighteenth century which are not wrong in the nineteenth. Complications of certain conditions may be harmful to the spiritual life—I mean, the best life of man. I do not use these words in an official sense. There are such things as the spiritual life of man, as the consecration of the man's powers to spiritual things; and when anything becomes harmful to them, no man living has a right to do it.

Now let us consider what the Church and the minister have to do in regard to these sins. In the first place there are some things which, as already said, are absolutely wrong. Slavery, for instance, is absolutely wrong: it is to be rooted out. On the other hand, when the minister comes to deal with a sin which has an individual and personal character, there can be no such absolute statement, and the one great, sublime function of the Christian minister is the awakening of the individual conscience to examine its own obligations, to recognize its own sins. I think it is not good that any man should accept a duty simply or solely upon the word of another man. Duty is something never done, unless it is done out of a man's own conscience. For me to go to the slave-holder and say, "It is wrong to hold any man in bondage," and to have him answer, "I cannot think so; but, since you think so, I will let them go free"—how absolutely unsatisfactory that is! There are always such things in the life of the minister when he feels that a man's own conscience has not come to have the fullest light and to work in the most legitimate and healthful way. The danger of the minister and the Church is that they should be satisfied with that, that they should be satisfied with something or other short of the absolute persuasion of the man's own conscience.

That is the position, then, of the clergy and of the Church with regard to those things which are absolute or intrinsic in their moral character.

With regard to those other sins that have grown out of the special complications of life, the work is not so clear. It is not so satisfactorily recognizable, but it is just as truly the work of the minister. Let me persuade the conscience of my fellow-man so that it works truly, so that he has really tried to do right, and I have done my total duty for that man. And when he comes to a different judgment from me, although I cannot see how he can do it, yet as a minister I may rest absolutely satisfied. When I have given him all the light I can, then I rest satisfied with the true independent judgment of his own life.

Now is there not left here a function for the minister? If our Christian Church, as a whole, could do that for our community and nation today; could call upon it and persuade it to cast away those sins which are absolutely and certainly wrong, and, with regard to all doubtful questions, to enter into a searching examination of them all and to act according to its best light, then the Christian minister would have regenerated our land. I do not believe that the Christian minister has a right to abdicate his function as the director of the human conscience; but it is important that he shall know that it is a living thing, and shall direct it as a living thing. Just as you put every power of growth into a tree, and then let it grow according to its nature, so with the conscience: we shall not bend it according to our conceptions of the right, we shall simply inspire it with a passion of righteousness, and then let it develop in its own true way. Here is a relation to the conscience which is quite enough to occupy your thoughts, your earnest anxiety, and your time, so long as you are ministers.

One thing more. Everything I have said to-night rests upon one great assumption, which we are anxious to have asserted in our country; and that is, that the people, not the ministers, are the Church. We quarrel with the phrase used in the old country, though not entirely unknown here. They speak of a young man as "gone into the Church," meaning thereby that he has become a minister; but ministers are nothing but the servants of the Church, and the clergy are nothing but their agents in doing the work which the Church has to do.

That was the good thing accomplished by our Puritan an-

cestors. New England would have been dominated and oppressed by its clergy years ago, if it had not been that every one of these stiff, stanch Puritans really felt that he belonged to the Church, that the minister was nothing but the servant, and that upon him rested the great responsibility, the real duty, and the persistence in the future of the Christian Church.

Then come back to that which I said at the very beginning, that the Christian Church, however we may talk of it distinctively, is nothing in the world except the first sketch of completed humanity. The Christian Church has nothing which is essential to its belief that all men ought not to be believing; it has no duties resting upon its members that all men ought not to be doing. Then I think we can see its relations truly to the community around us.

The majority of men do not today belong in associated relations to the Christian Church. What does that mean? First, that the Christian Church has not made itself broad enough to make earnest and true men recognize the ideal of their humanity in it; that it has been too special, too fantastic. Secondly, that it has a great work before it so to declare its human application that it shall commend itself to every man who really is in earnest in his thought and earnest in his deed. The Church seems to me to have that great function before it, and never to have had the possibility for the fulfilment of that duty so large and open before it in all the ages of its existence as today. Therefore I would rather be a Christian minister than anything else; and I welcome with all my heart those of you who are preparing for that good work.

RESERVE IN MATTERS OF RELIGION¹

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I think it safe to assume—and I shall assume—that every college student has a certain amount of religious conviction and belief—more than we sometimes think—more perhaps than he is himself conscious of having. I am emboldened to say this because I believe that religion—that is, the relation of the human in us to the divine in us and above us—is a part of the essential nature of man, potential even though latent in every man, and because the Christian environment in which most college students have passed their early days must have called these potentialities into more or less distinct consciousness.

But what I recall in myself as a young man, and what I see in others, tells me that when this religious consciousness is made the object of appeal and of summons to expression and action it is very much inclined to withdraw within itself, and to fold itself about with reserve, and even to take on a kind of resistance. And when I examine this state of mind in myself and others, I think I can see that in a certain stage of spiritual immaturity, and perhaps more or less always, this reserve in religious expression is justifiable and even normal.

First, because religion itself is so largely a matter of mystery. The realities on which it rests are not matters of exact knowledge. We know only in part. The whole region is the domain of imagination and faith and spiritual vision, and is to be approached with wonder and awe and silence. The truly reverent spirit will not rush into its precincts with unseemly assurance. Faith itself will shrink from hasty affirmations. Something is to be said for a modest agnosticism: "Though desiring to know, and hoping to know, I do know but little as yet." How much better this than to say, either, on the one hand, "I know that I cannot know," or, on the other hand, "I know that I know," we mean-

¹A Vesper Address to Students.

while questioning the reality of your knowledge, and not being convinced by your assurance.

Again, some degree of reserve may be pardoned as a natural and healthful reaction and protest in the face of much overconfident assertion and profession. When utterance on these high and solemn themes ceases to be cautious and modest, when religious avowals become voluble and loquacious, then very properly reserve comes to the rescue of sincerity, and says within the heart of the young man, "Beware of this! Keep well on the safe side of this!"

Again, religious consciousness rightly claims for itself certain sacred rights of privacy. The deeper our feelings on any subject, the less we are inclined to make confidants of others. There is a beautiful shyness in youth respecting very deep feeling, and most of all perhaps in respect to religion. *Maxima debetur reverentia*—the profoundest respect is due to the sacred intimacies of the young heart in its religious musings. Let us not misconstrue reserve as though it were necessarily apathy. Deep silences may hold what loud voices could never utter.

Have we now done full justice to this side of the subject—to the causes, the meaning, the merits, the rights, of reserve in matters of religion? If so, we may now look at some considerations on the other side.

First, when reserve passes a certain limit, and becomes actual repression of a genuine conviction or emotion, it works hurt to the moral nature. Modesty, reticence, is good: enforced dumbness is not good. We endanger our sincerity, certainly our frankness, when we put too heavy a restraint upon our convictions or our feelings. There are times when to suppress feeling is to induce and even cultivate stoicism. A confirmed habit of apathy is devitalizing. There are communities of Christians who suffer both spiritually and ethically from an abnormal dread of enthusiasm, as there are also those who suffer from forcing and counterfeiting enthusiasm. Some poet—I forget who he is—has given us a person—a girl, I think—who is so oppressed by a secret she must not tell that she runs off and whispers it to the brook, and so relieves her heart. There are religious emotions which so

burden and oppress the heart, there are others which so exalt and inspire, that they must have expression. To stifle them is a harm and a wrong to the moral nature.

Again, too great reticence in matters of religion is unsocial—may even be a social wrong. It is sometimes said that one's religion is something between one's own soul and God. It is that and something more. It is a source of new social relations and duties. Even when we have entered into our closet and shut the door, we are in thought to bring in others and say "Our Father." At one time in my youth I used to meet every day a very distinguished scholar of world-wide fame, who was known as an unbeliever, and allowed himself to be so known. This perplexed us young men. Here was a man of great ability, whom we admired as young men will admire a great man; and what we understood him to say to us was that for some untold reason he declined to be ranked as a Christian. But after his death, when his will was made public, we learned that he there made avowal of devout faith in Christ, an avowal which he had withheld because it would have been to his worldly advantage to make it. A beautiful and heroic act of self-denial, doubtless, but one in which a teacher of young men might have questioned his right to indulge himself. In place of helping us to settle one of the great questions of life in what he himself thought the right way, he, by his unnatural and easily misconstrued silence, hindered us from making a right decision. I suppose that all of us, according to our degree and light—we mature men and teachers, you young men and women, with far more power in certain ways to influence your fellows than we have—are all the time, whether we will or no, saying something to one another on this greatest of questions; saying it by silence as well as by speech, by withholding perhaps the simple, frank word which brotherhood and fair dealing would prompt us to say.

For when we come to think of it, while on one side religion is mystery, and tends to induce brooding and reverie rather than speech, on the other side it is hope, cheer, inspiration, power, life. The final word of religion is not silence but song. Personify religion, and you cannot imagine her speechless, dumb, a nun of La Trappe, as it were. She will rather be a St. Cecilia. It

is on this account that so much of the Bible is poetry; and that so large a part of the best poetry is religious. A man belies his religion if his habitual expression of it is reluctant and restrained and prosaic. Doctor Arnold maintained that even the creeds and confessions should be set to music and sung—that they are not syllogisms but lyrics. If you will look for it, you will find a good deal of theology in the “Te Deum”—more and better than in some creeds—but it is theology sublimated into religion, and given forth in great peals of song.

Can we now put our two thoughts together into some reconciling statement? Reserve in matters of religion is good in its place. That place is not where it covers voluntary apathy, or a spirit of indecision, or a distaste for the things of the Spirit. Let no one think that reserve is of such merit in itself that it condones an attitude of reluctance and aloofness toward religion itself. Reserve is in place when it affords a refuge from the persistence of opinion and emotion and action which may have the approval of one person, but which he has no right to force upon another; when one is brought into the presence of a great truth or a great movement, which for the time awes and stirs him, before which he stands waiting and expectant like the disciples when they were “all gathered together in one place” waiting for the Pentecostal impulse which gave them utterance; or, finally, when in all humility, and with some disappointment with self, one is conscious of a lack of inward response to a call which others find compelling, but to which one may not give simulated or counterfeited assent. There is no more pathetic situation in religious experience than that of the many persons who are silent and sad while others are filled with the Spirit, and who, notwithstanding, sit not in the seats of the scornful. And let us understand that always, even when at its best, reserve is provisional, a stage in progress, never a counsel of perfection.

And, finally, a word as to the claims and merits of utterance. Gardeners and florists find that the life of the plant depends as really on the leaves as on the root—indeed that the root itself depends as much on the leaves as the leaves on the root. Carry this principle up into the spiritual realm and it means that the

spiritual life cannot be healthy and growing without spiritual utterance in appropriate forms. The Psalmist says of the good man, "His leaf also shall not wither." To repress or minimize intellectual and emotional expression causes the inner life to shrivel and wither. Hence the pains which the Church has taken in all ages, following the example of our Lord himself, to encourage and guide religious utterance. Hence among the most precious and most prized gifts of the Spirit are those supremely great utterances of belief and praise and prayer which the saints, that is the gifted and superior souls, have left to us who have all their needs but gifts and attainments how far less than theirs! How poor spiritually should we be if deprived of them! How thankful are we that we have them! How ungrateful and unwise if we neglect them! It is open to question whether certain methods which encourage extremely immature Christians to give public utterance to their thoughts and feelings is spiritually wise. But the wisdom of the Church and of the Spirit has provided a more excellent way. In psalm and hymn and anthem; in the inspired utterances of patriarchs, prophets, apostles, evangelists, martyrs; in the biographies of devout men who have left records of their penitence, their consecration, their aspirations; we have an anthology of spiritual utterance from which we can appropriate confession, and trust, and hope, and praise, in accordance with our needs and desires. Why should we confine ourselves to an iteration of the little worn-out phrases of our particular conventicle, when we have full heritage in the oecumenical psalmody of devotion? Why should we be pleased and satisfied with the tinkle of the religious nursery, when all the pipes and stops of the great organ of spiritual melody are ours if we will only command them? When all the Church with its thousand voices is crying to us,

"O magnify the Lord with me, and let us exalt his name together," be it ours to respond,

"O Lord, open thou our lips, and our mouth shall show forth thy praise."

ARTICLES ON RELIGION IN PERIODICALS¹

Periodical articles on religion are like the plague of frogs in Egypt not only in number but in the fact that they appear in the most unlikely, not to say unsuitable, places. A special apparatus is indispensable to all who have any reason to try to keep track of them. Mr. Ernest Richardson, formerly librarian of Hartford Theological Seminary, now of Princeton University, an experienced hand, with the co-operation of several other bibliographers, has undertaken the laborious task of preparing a special index to this literature on the general plan of Poole's Index. The volume before us includes articles on religion published in the ten years, 1890 to 1899 inclusive, in not far from fifteen hundred periodicals. At a rough estimate, making no subtraction for repetition, the whole number of entries is between 60,000 and 70,000.

The index arrangement has wisely been preferred to any scheme of systematic classification. To each entry title is subjoined a short definition and a reference to some convenient Encyclopaedia in which the user may find general information on the subject. The definitions are sometimes inadequate or incorrect, as when Shamanism is described as "Religion of the fisheries of the Arctic region," or Halakah as "Jewish literary work (2 forms)," and the references not infrequently to sources of no credit or long out of date; but these shortcomings do not impair the usefulness of the Index, to which presumably no one will resort for first aid to the ignorant.

The distribution of articles under the sub-headings of the longer titles is not always well-considered: for example, under Armenia is a special head, "Armenia (massacre)," yet many articles on this subject are not to be found there, but under the

¹An Alphabetical Subject Index and Index Encyclopaedia to Periodical Articles on Religion, 1890-1899. Compiled and edited by Ernest Cushing Richardson. 8vo, pp. 42+1168. New York: Published for the Hartford Seminary Press by Charles Scribner's Sons. [Copyright 1907.] Price \$10 net.

main entry, apparently because the word "massacre" does not occur in the title. Articles referring to Regensburg are divided, on no discoverable principle, between "Ratisbon" and "Regensburg," and the cross-reference runs only one way. The main classification itself is sometimes erroneous: "Occultism," e.g., is so defined as to exclude magic, but an article on the history of magic is entered under Occultism, doubtless because the title runs, "Les sciences occultes au xviii si cle."

Even the simplest index classification of articles, many of which are known only by title, few of which can possibly have been read—a classification mechanically made by cataloguers—cannot help putting many articles in a wrong place; or at least not in the place where a scholar would most naturally look for them. The only remedy for this state of things is either an objectionable duplication of entries or a very free use of cross-references. In the volume before us cross-references are used much too sparingly: under "Animal worship," e.g., there is no reference to "Totemism," and conversely; under "Religion" there is none to "Paganism," yet two or three important articles on the history of religion are buried under the latter entry.

In conclusion it is perhaps not inappropriate to warn the student or the "general reader," who cannot for himself distinguish the obsolete, the void, and the fatuous from the live and significant, that such an index as this is a dangerous tool. Indeed, it might be maintained without paradox that nothing contributes more to the perpetuation of antiquated error and humbug than indexes—especially to periodical literature—and the subject-catalogues of great libraries; for they make it possible to "read up" and "write up" anything in heaven or earth, without the painful necessity of knowing anything about it.

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